


WEST AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO BUILD REGIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF
PAST ECOWAS INTERVENTIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS NEEDED TO
INCREASE ITS PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

WEST AFRICA'S EFFORTS TO BUILD REGIONAL SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF PAST ECOWAS INTERVENTIONS TO DETERMINE WHAT IS NEEDED TO INCREASE ITS PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES, by Captain Papa Birane Dieye (Senegal), 165 pages.

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On nous tue, on ne nous déshonore pas.

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ACRONYMS

AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
ACOTA	African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRICOM	Africa Command
AMIS	African Mission in Sudan
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
ACDS	African Chiefs of Defense and Security
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CJCS	Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CPLP	<i>Comunidade dos Paises de Lingua Portuguesa</i> (Community of Portuguese Language Countries)
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMICI	ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force

EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FN	<i>Forces Nouvelles</i> (New Forces)
FPI	<i>Front Populaire Ivoirien</i> (Ivorian Popular Front)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNR	Government of National Reconciliation
GNU	Government of National Unity
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KIA	Killed in action
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAD	Mutual Assistance in Defense
MFDC	<i>Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance</i> (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance)
MINUCI	<i>Mission des Nations Unies en Côte d'Ivoire</i> (United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire)
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSC	Mediation and Security Council
NDLP	National Democratic Party of Liberia

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONOGBIS	United Nations Peace building Office in Guinea-Bissau
PCASED	Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development
PDCI	<i>Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire</i> (Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire)
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RDR	<i>Rassemblement des Républicains</i>
REC	Regional Economic Community
REAMP	<i>Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix</i> (Capacity Building of African Peackeeping)
ROE	Rules Of Engagement
RUF	Revolutionary Unified Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
SRES	Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary
UK	United Kingdom
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
URSS	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
US	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WB	World Bank
WIA	Wounded in action

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

In a modernizing society, security means development. Security is not military hardware, though it may include it; security is not military force, though it may involve it; security is not traditional military activity, though it may compass it. Security is development, and without development, there can be no security.¹

— Mr. Robert McNamara
Former US Secretary of Defense and President of the World Bank

This above quote emphasizes the intertwined and inseparable relationships between security and development. Security is development, and without development there can be no security. One of the first threats against development is security and vice versa. Physical insecurity and political instability remain the major obstacles to economic growth in West Africa.² Because free markets and democracy cannot flourish amid chronic conflict,³ the West African region's development is seriously compromised by its lack of regional security. The number of conflicts in the region had resulted in widespread the retardation of West Africa's economic growth.

Since just before the end of the Cold War, West African countries have faced a large variety of security issues jeopardizing their aspiration for development. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, their determination to control conflicts breaking out in the region has taken the form of creating regional and multinational forces dedicated to keeping the peace. This determination led to the decision of creating a new regional security organization through the African Union (AU). Indeed, in May 2003 the African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) adopted a document entitled "The Policy

Framework Document on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF).” The final concept for the ASF, adopted by the Heads of State, provided for five standby brigade level forces, one in each of Africa’s five regions. The standby brigade for the western side of Africa is called Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF).

According to Barry Buzan, Professor of International relations, a regional security complex is a “group of states whose primarily security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another”⁴ Even though most contemporary conflicts in West Africa are defined “domestic,” they are deeply embedded in a regional context. In the context of the ESF, it is important to stress the fact that the new mechanism of ASF established a requirement for each of the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to be able to intervene both locally and continentally under the leadership of ASF.

Even though the new regional ambition to try to build, once again, a regional security is encouraging, the reviewed experience of regional organization building in Africa remains pessimistic. This pessimism is due to leadership struggles, lack of regional coherence because of the difference of language and cultural approach, leaders’ reluctance to subordinate their authority to the organization, suspicion, rivalries, lack of means and realism, the issue of ratification and implementation of collective decisions, leaders’ refusal of addressing the root cause while fighting the symptoms of instability and so forth. However, as ECOWAS with its two decades-long peacekeeping background is the most experienced regional organization on the African continent in terms of peace building, and as West African countries have realized that conflicts do not necessarily

stay within a nation's boundaries, renewed regional security through the ESF must generate hope and expectations.

The main purpose of a study on West African countries' efforts to build a regional security is to emphasize a new approach for ECOWAS member states consisting of a need to think more at the regional level. The end state of this study would be the assessment of West African countries' ability to manage their regional security issues through the new ESF mechanism. It is clearly understood that regional security instruments are basic instruments for civil society to develop and prosper. Security organizations can only assist in setting the conditions for civil society to achieve the political equilibrium required to foster that development. Thus, in order for West Africa to be at peace and develop politically and economically, an effective security arrangement is needed to help set those conditions. In support of a strategy of which its objective is the establishment of an enhanced regional security for West Africa, this study, focusing on the operational level, intends to identify the "ways" and "means" the region needs to achieve an effective collective security.

Background

Dealing with West African security issues requires a comprehensive vision just due to the large size of this region (6.5 million square kilometers of land area). West Africa comprises sixteen (16) countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,⁵ Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo (see figure 1).



Figure 1. Map of West Africa

Source: ECOWAS, “Map of ECOWAS,” <http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&source=hp&q=ECOWAS+map> (accessed 13 September 2009).

By the Treaty of Lagos on 28 May 1975, West African countries⁶ established ECOWAS which set out to achieve a definite objective stating to promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, monetary and financial questions. Its secretariat is based in Abuja, Nigeria. This bold move brought together states with varying sizes and diversities in historical, political and economic background. Its purpose was to give practical expression to several failed attempts at regional economic cooperation, as a strategy for fulfilling the nationalist’s dream in the region.⁷ So, it is clearly understood that, even during the eighties, the lack of structured mechanism of conflict resolution within the region, exposed local conflicts to external power.

According to its general objective established during its creation, it is obvious that the security role was not at all an explicit task for ECOWAS. This western REC ventured

into the field of security arose out of a later realization that for regional economic cooperation, an atmosphere of peace and stability must pervade the area, and that unresolved disputes between member states could escalate into armed conflicts.⁸ In 1989, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Abass Bundu stated that “the Liberian crisis has demonstrated . . . that it is futile to talk about economic integration unless the environment in which you pursue such integration is peaceful and secure.”⁹ ECOWAS’s transformation from an economic to a political integrative scheme started with the promulgation of the 1976 Non-Recourse to Aggression Treaty. Subsequently, the protocol on non-aggression¹⁰ adopted at a Conference of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS held in Dakar, Senegal on 22 April 1978 and the agreement relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense (MAD)¹¹ adopted in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981 were additional steps to face security issues within the region. But these protocols including commission of mediation, ad-hoc committees and so forth did not achieve the expected peace goals.

In 1990, ECOWAS inaugurated a military arm, called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). In 1989, war broke out in Liberia when a rebel movement, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the leadership of Charles Ghankay Taylor, contested the power controlled by then President Samuel Doe. The ECOMOG’s engagement in Liberia was the first real attempt by African countries to resolve an African conflict.¹² Two things prompted the ECOWAS to engage an ad hoc military force for the Liberian conflict. First, this conflict threatened the stability of the region with the risks to thinks like refugees’ movements and weapons circulation. Second, for a decade after the ending of the Cold War, both the remaining superpowers and the other great

powers had less incentive and displayed less will to intervene in security affairs outside their own region.¹³ The US and France ceased to make blatant interventions into African conflicts as they had done during the Cold War.¹⁴ For instance, the French Army intervened at least thirty times in Africa between 1963 and 1993 to prop up or replace client regimes.¹⁵ It is stunning, however to see the reaction of the US when the conflict started in Liberia a country hitherto regarded as a long-standing special relationship with the US.¹⁶ The United Nations (UN) has not been very responsive in intervening. The international community's response to ECOMOG's foray into Liberia was one of wait and see.¹⁷

Initially designated for a brief operation in Liberia, ECOMOG also deployed in Sierra-Leone (1998 to 1999), in Guinea Bissau (1998 to 1999), again in Liberia (2003) and in Cote d'Ivoire (2002 to 2004). The ECOMOG interventions marked an important turning point in the practice of peacekeeping by African regional organizations. However, this ECOWAS "commitment" to interfere in internal affairs of states did not meet the agreement of all its member states. After the independence era, the traditional closely guarded sovereignty of African states undermined the ability of the OAU and other regional organizations to establish a supranational body with enough power and legitimacy to deal with African conflicts.¹⁸ In spite of deep opposition based on rivalries among member states prior to ECOWAS' first engagement in Liberia, regional leaders have been under pressure to transform ECOMOG into a permanent regional force within a general ECOWAS security framework.¹⁹ This Liberian conflict served as a wake-up call for the region to fashion its own security agenda.

In December 1999, at a summit in Lomé, Togo, ECOWAS adopted a new protocol relating to Conflict, Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security with a view to implementing improvements in its legal system as an organization for regional security. After a decade of ad hoc approaches, this new protocol was an attempt to standardize key operational procedures, doctrines and missions in future ECOMOG interventions. Its main aim is to tackle a wide range of security issues.²⁰ The mechanism proposed the establishment of three organs to implement the security decisions: the Mediation and Security Council, the Defense and Security Commission (consisting of Chiefs of Army Staff) and the Council of Elders.²¹ Although ECOWAS's highest decision-making body is the Authority of Heads of States and Government of member states, the core function of its regional security initiatives is shouldered by the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). The MSC consists of a total of nine countries that can make decisions on matters relating to peace and security on the behalf of the Authority. The Council operates through three committees: the Committee of Ambassadors, the Committee of Foreign Minister of defense and Internal Affairs and the Committee of Heads of States.²²

In December 2001, ECOWAS adopted a specific protocol on democracy and good governance as a supplement to the December 1999 protocol which set out guiding principle for intra-state relations. Chapter IV of the 1999 protocol establishes an Early Warning System (EWS). The aim of this system is to improve capabilities for conflict prevention and early response by promptly detecting, gathering, monitoring and analyzing sign of threats or breakdown that affects regional peace and security.²³ Given

the fact that new conflicts have deep roots, the EWS would have to examine the causes of impeding conflicts through the four offices set up within the region.²⁴

Until May 2003,²⁵ the multiple endeavors by ECOWAS member states to initiate new regional security architectures in West Africa must be seen as a positive sign of dedication and commitment to the region's security issues. Obviously, West African leaders cannot be blamed for imagination failure. However, at the same time, these various attempts to tackle the recurrence and emergence of new conflicts through mechanisms and interminable protocols show a kind of pretense of demonstrating progress by the region's leadership. As a result of a succession of mechanisms and protocols, at the operational level the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and ECOWAS are in the process of setting up their regional brigades and agreeing on issues of harmonization and standardization between them. The deadline is in 2010. The embryonic ESF can be an effective solution to address security challenges the region may face. At least three reasons militate in favor of its establishment.

First, the commitment of developed nations to African domestic affairs will continue to dwindle. For instance, there is a declining relationship with France in West Africa. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic, has already unveiled major trends in this regard. On 26 July 2007, in Dakar, Senegal he presented his vision of Africa using some concepts to justify a lower commitment, or even disinterest in Africa.²⁶ The new United States (US) engagement in the region through a new combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), is also seen as only beneficial to US interests

(the local natural resources, the increasing presence of China and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).²⁷ Even China, the newcomer, is accordingly seen as an opportunistic superpower only interested in its economic interests.²⁸ Western countries or organizations like the European Union (EU), the US, and Canada continue to implement security programs within the region but critical voices argue that these programs have neither been coordinated nor been consultative. These concerns led Tom Ikimi, former Nigerian Foreign Minister to state that “it is a matter of concern that every time Africa succeed in formulating a common position on critical issues, our external friends always manage to come up with an alternative solution. We are being confronted with a proliferation of uncoordinated initiatives.”²⁹

Second, the UN authorizes and promotes the establishment of permanent regional security organizations through its chapter 8 which deals with regional arrangements. The members of the UN entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through those regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council.³⁰ Article 52 and 53 of chapter 8 of the UN Charter recognizes regional arrangements as viable to deal with matters related to international peace and security as long as they comply with the “purposes and principles of the United Nations.” In addition, those regional arrangements enable the UN to be less overburdened all the more since to a UN standpoint, Somalia (1993) and Rwanda (1994) call back awful souvenirs. In his 1995 report on *Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa*, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was even more specific:

The founders of the UN, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and assisting the UN in containing them.³¹

Third, especially from a local standpoint, there are a growing number of people who increasingly believe in the dictum that Africans should solve their problems themselves. The Africans wish to “break the dependence on outside military assistance in responding to African conflicts.”³² The creation of the AU on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, can be seen as a step of crucial importance in the development of a new peace and security architecture for all of Africa.³³ During his term as chairman of the AU, now former South African President Thabo Mbeki urged member states to give special priority to establishing the ASF five regional brigades to allow the continent to solve its conflicts. “Recent international events have confirmed the need for us Africans to do everything we can to rely on our own capacities to secure our continent’s renaissance,” Mbeki said.³⁴

Assessment of the Current West African Environment

Unfortunately, West Africa is characterized by the perpetration of tension and the prevalence of conflicts,³⁵ making it the most unsecure and unstable region in Africa. The factors causing instability require examining their root causes. The most critical challenges affecting West African security are high rates of youth unemployment, the emerging problem of drug trafficking, the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the bloody struggle for power, and a vulnerable and weak economic climate.

While most Western countries are facing demographic decline and an aging population, West Africa's population growth is very rapid. From 315 million inhabitants in 2007, the population could reach 480 million by 2030. The population itself is also mostly young, (more than 55 percent are under 25 years of age).³⁶ This growing number of young people, instead of being a valuable resource, represents a big challenge for West African countries in terms of increased pressure on its political, social, physical and economic environments. As an example, the unemployment rate is extremely high: 85 percent in Liberia, 77 percent in Burkina Faso and 48 percent in Senegal, just to cite a few.³⁷ Labor migration to city or mine from impoverished and underdeveloped rural areas has shaped the lives and expectations of many young people in sub-Saharan Africa for a generation or more.³⁸ As a result, warlords coerce disaffected and unemployed youth into conflicts. The use of children in warfare still represents a chronic and sordid contemporary problem in spite of the Accra Declaration and Plan of Action adopted by ECOWAS member states in April 2000.³⁹

West Africa has also become an increasingly important transit hub for drug trafficking as international criminal networks exploit the region's lack of resources to combat drug smuggling.⁴⁰ The region, located in a strategic position as seen in figure 2, is still at the heart of an illegal drug trade carrying large amounts of narcotics coming from South America to Europe.⁴¹ According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2008, approximately 27 percent of cocaine consumed in Europe comes through the West African region and, for instance in Guinea Bissau, the value of the drugs trade is greater than the entire national income.⁴² The implications for the region and its youth are serious.




Figure 2. Map of Drug Network

Source: UNODC World Drug, 2007, http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/42468000/gif/_42468546_w_africa_cocaine_416.gif (accessed 8 June 2009).

Third, the proliferation of small arms remains another important source of destabilization and conflict in the region. Globally, much of the weaponry entered the region during the Cold War from both sides for use in proxy wars.⁴³ Since the Cold War ended, the flow of arms has continued. In principle, small arms are not supposed to be flowing into West Africa. As on 31 October 1998, the members of ECOWAS pledged not to import, export or manufacture SALW⁴⁴ but this moratorium has since become a legally binding and permanent convention,⁴⁵ routinely flouted, with disastrous consequences for human rights and regional security. Later in 1999, the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), directed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was created to face the spread of small arms. Due to the proliferation of SALW, thousands of people have already been killed, hundreds of

thousands displaced or made refugees through conflicts based on religion, ethnicity, natural resources or national borders.⁴⁶ Intensified efforts are needed to curb the scourge of SALW in the region.

The struggle for power is the root of most of the instability. Besides the lack of open and transparent elections, West Africa confronts the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government and undemocratic seizures of power. Coups d'états are very frequent.⁴⁷ From 1960 to 1990, 267 coups or coup attempts are registered in the whole African continent.⁴⁸ In West Africa, from independence through 2004, the sixteen West African states have experienced forty-four military-led coups.⁴⁹ From 1999, at least half of these sixteen countries have experienced this kind of power seizure (see table 1). Unfortunately, as stated by Jimmy Kandeh, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Richmond, “the incidence of coups appears to be on the wane in West Africa but the conditions that give rise to such interventions persist and may yet obstruct or derail the sub-region’s fragile democratic experiment.”⁵⁰ In addition, the attempt to monopolize the increasingly scarce natural resources sparks insurgencies, inflaming ethnic rivalries, interminable border protests between states and mass displacement of people.

Table 1. Coups and Attempted Coups in West Africa Since 1999

Countries	Date of coups	Date of attempted coups
Niger	August 9, 1999	August, 5 2002
Cote d'Ivoire	December 24, 1999	January 8, 2001 September 19, 2002
Guinea Bissau	September 14, 2003	December 2, 2001 November 22, 2008
Mauritania	August 3, 2005 August 6, 2008	June 7, 2003 August 9, 2004 September 28, 2004
Liberia		June 9, 2003 July 19, 2007
Burkina Faso		September 23, 2003
Gambia		March 22, 2006
Togo	February 5, 2005	
Guinea	December 23, 2008	

Source: Multipol, Analysis: Africa and the Resurgence of Coups and Attempted Coups, <http://blog.multipol.org/post/2008/12/28/ANALYSE-%3A-Afrique-%3A-la-resurgence-des-coups-dEtat-et-des-tentatives-de-coups-dEtat> (accessed 2 October 2009).

Finally, as a consequence of political instability and physical insecurity, the economic climate in West Africa is disastrous. The countries of the region are among the poorest of the world. The similarity shared by the majority of West African countries is that they are generally described as least developed or underdeveloped states in terms of their level of economic development and social progress.⁵¹ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of more than 50 countries in the world exceed U.S. \$20,000, while, with the exception of Cape Verde with a GDP per capita of \$3,200, West African countries' GDP per capita do not exceed \$2,000.⁵² These countries are unable to manage the few available resources or implement policies to promote economic growth. This situation contributes to an environment where instability thrives.

Not one of the West African countries is unfamiliar with these five earlier described roots of instability in the region.⁵³ For instance, Nigeria is facing serious religious conflicts and insurgents in the Niger Delta region; Mauritania and Guinea experienced military coups recently; in Guinea Bissau, the ridiculous rivalry between the former Head of state and his Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) was fatal to these two leaders; Senegal is facing Casamance separatists; the *Tuareg* problem continues to simmer in Mali and Niger; Liberia and Ivory Coast are still under UN peacekeeping missions after a series of bloody conflicts and Sierra Leone is just recovering from a violent civil war. In most conflicts, there is incapacity of the national armed forces to face the security dilemma because of the very heavy handed approach used, the lack of adequate equipments and political choices of central governments.

Significance of the Study:

West African region is characterized by a large variety of security issues. In *The Coming Anarchy*, Robert Kaplan portrays this region as having the potential to become the real strategic danger threatening international peace and security. West African countries have shown their will to build a regional security through ECOWAS. Various initiatives have taken place with the aim to address the key drivers of insecurity. The necessity to go further is obvious as increased instability is threatening West Africa's survival. The benefits expected to come from this study can be significant since they will not only provide a clear understanding of the job done so far by ECOWAS in stabilizing the region through ad hoc as well as permanent security mechanisms, but may also be the beginning of more study and analysis relating to the embryonic mechanism known as the ESF.

Primary Research Question

How can West African countries best build a viable, decisive, comprehensive and long lasting collective security that will be able to efficiently face the sub-region's security issues?

Secondary Research Questions

To further investigate the primary research question, the following secondary questions will need to be addressed:

1. In terms of regional security, which ECOMOG operations were successful or less successful and why?
2. What are the required local actions to be taken in order to fix things that used to hinder the efficiency of former ECOMOG interventions?
3. How can the ESF respond efficiently to regional security issues?
4. To what extent can West African countries have its traditional partners such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) help it support its efforts in building greater regional security?

Assumptions

The researcher sees the following assumptions as being valid for this thesis:

1. West African countries will continue to experience security issues as the consequences of poverty (rural depopulation, hunger, economic despair and vulnerability, unemployment youth restiveness), failure of institutions of governments, ethno-political disputes and border protests.

2. Conventional warfare between West African countries is not highly probable despite unresolved issues and shared natural resources disagreements.

3. Western competition for West Africa's natural resources will continue impacting negatively on the local population since it fuels poor governance.

4. West Africa will remain a marginalized sub-region in the world.

5. In Africa, ECOWAS will remain the most experienced regional organization in terms of conducting peace operations.

Limitations

Despite a comparison with the other regions of Africa, this paper will be limited to West African countries' ability to build and maintain a collective security. The largest limitation for this study is the relative novelty of this topic because of the ongoing creation of the ESF.

Delimitations

This thesis is not a study on the ongoing UN peacekeeping missions in West Africa (Ivory Coast and Liberia), neither is it an attempt to scrutinize root causes of conflicts in West Africa.

Definitions of Terms

Armed conflict: confrontations between two or more nations, a nation and a body other than a nation or a nation and a dissident faction or two ethnic groups within a nation.

Authority: means the Authority of heads of State and Government of the ECOWAS established by article 7 of the ECOWAS Treaty.

Continental: In this paper, continental is used to refer to the whole Africa especially the level of the African Union (AU)

Francophone: A country or region in which the French language is commonly spoken.

Insurgent: A member of an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.

Light weapons: Those weapons that fire 5.56 or 7.62mm rounds (or smaller) and can be operated by a single person (not crew-served).

Lusophone: A country or region in which the Portuguese language is commonly spoken.

Protocol: An international agreement that usually complements or expands upon an existing treaty or agreement.

Regional: Regional is a term used to refer to regions within Africa such as East, West, North, South and Central

Standby force: An available force of a determined volume, often permanent, ready to be engaged in a various kinds of missions.

State: A term commonly used in international relations to refer to a nation or country.

Thesis Overview:

This first chapter was an introduction to the thesis. It provided the context for West African countries to build their collective security and emphasized the importance of the question of security in relation to development. Chapter 2, Literature Review, will

provide a review of relevant research and literature as it applies to the study. The purpose will be the identification of what is and is not known already, facts and opinions on the topic. Chapter 3, Methodology, will focus on the description of the qualitative content analysis methodology used to examine the research products obtained. Chapter 4, Analysis, will present the analysis of the answers found to the issues addressed in the thesis statement and the secondary research questions. Lastly, chapter 5 will present a conclusion and recommendation for further study.

¹Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 149.

²General Lamine Cissé, Former Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff of the Senegalese Armed Forces, “Peacekeeping and Security Issues in West Africa” (Lecture Washington, DC, 27 October 2004).

³Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2004), 179.

⁴James Hentz and Morten Boas, *New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 18.

⁵Mauritania is a country located in West Africa but is no longer a member of ECOWAS since December 1999 when Mawouwa Ould Taya was Chief of State.

⁶These West African countries included Mauritania which signed shortly after the Treaty of Lagos.

⁷Charles Ukeje, “From Economic Cooperation to Collective Security: ECOWAS and the Changing Imperatives of Sub-regionalism in West Africa” (Paper for CODESRIA’s 30th anniversary celebrations, 6 September 2003).

⁸Adeniji Olu, “Mechanism for Conflict Management in West Africa: Politics and Harmonization” (Report, Conflict Management in West Africa, 21 May 1999), 33.

⁹Francis Deng, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, DC: The Brooking Institutions, 1996), 142.

¹⁰The Protocol on Non-Aggression called on member states to resolve their conflicts peacefully through ECOWAS. Its Article 1 states that member states shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or

from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity of political independence of other Member States. It was signed by 16 countries including Mauritania. See Economic Community of West African States, *Protocol on Non-aggression*, http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_Union/pdfs/ecowas/14ProtNonAggre.pdf (accessed 22 October 2009).

¹¹The Mutual Assistance of Defense (MAD) promised mutual assistance for externally instigated or supported aggression as well as the creation of an Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC), consisting of stand-by forces from ECOWAS states. This force was never established. Its Article 2 states that member states declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community. See Economic Community of West African States, *Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance of Defense*, http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/13ProtMutualDefAss.pdf (accessed 22 October 2009).

¹²In May 1991, the Tanzanian Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OUA evaluated ECOWAS's intervention. To him, ECOWAS's actions had earned international respect for Africa. See *The Guardian*, Nigeria, 8 May 1991; *African Concord*, Nigeria, 22 April 1991.

¹³Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3.

¹⁴Ochiai Takehico, "Dealing with Conflict: African Security Architecture and the P3 Initiative," http://nels.nii.ac.jp/els/110006607800.pdf?id=ART0008576214&type=pdf&lang=en&host=cinii&order_no=&ppv_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1258513281&cp= (accessed 17 November 2009).

¹⁵John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothschild, *Africa in World Politics: Post- Cold War Challenges* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), 176.

¹⁶National Defense University, *Strategic Assessment 1997: Flashpoint and Force Structure* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1997), 64.

¹⁷William Agyapong, "Military Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts in West Africa: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group as a Case Study" (Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 3.

¹⁸Emmanuel K. Aning, "ECOWAS's Evolving Conflict Management System," *African Security Review* 9, no 5/6 (2000).

¹⁹Seth Appiah-Mensah, "Security is Like Oxygen: A Regional Security Mechanism for West Africa," http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JIW/is_3_54/ai_80786333/ (accessed 15 November 2009).

²⁰ Michael Pugh, and Waheguru Sidhu, *The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 245.

²¹ Adekeye Adebajo, and Ismail O. D. Rashid, *West Africa's Security Challenge: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 8.

²² Abass Ademola, "The New Collective Security Mechanism of ECOWAS: Innovations and Problems," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 5, no. 2 (2000): 211.

²³ "ECOWAS Early Warning System (ESW) (Sensitization Workshop, Ange Hill Hotel, Accra, March 2007, http://www.wanep.org/image/pr_ecowarn.pdf (accessed 5 November 2009).

²⁴ The first office located in Banjul, Gambia, includes Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Senegal. The second, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso includes Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali and Niger. The third office is in Monrovia, Liberia and includes Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ghana. The last office located in Cotonou, Benin includes Benin, Nigeria and Togo. For more details see ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, <http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedao/english/ap101299.htm> (accessed 14 November 2009).

²⁵ In May 2003 the African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) adopted "The Policy Framework Document on the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF)." See Jakkie Cilliers, "The African Standby Force: An Update on Progress" Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No 160, March 2008, http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=22&slink_id=5907&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3 (accessed 21 October 2009).

²⁶ Michel Gary, "France and Africa: A Declining Relationships," <http://europeancourier.org/113.htm> (accessed 22 October 2009).

²⁷ Derek S. Reveron, Associate Professor for National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College (Briefing, 19 July 2007), <http://africacommand.org/Documents/AFRICOMJuly19.pdf> (accessed 12 August 2009).

²⁸ David Shinn, "An Opportunistic Ally: China's Increasing Involvement in Africa," *Harvard International Review* (Summer 2007), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_2_29/ai_n29369311/ (accessed 2 November 2009).

²⁹ Emmanuel K. Aning, "Peacekeeping African Style," *West Africa* (4 May 2000): 430.

³⁰ United Nations (UN) Charter, Chapter 8, article 52.

³¹ UN Document A/50/711 and S/1995/911, "Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa," Report of the Secretary General.

³²Comfort Ero, “ECOMOG: A Model for Africa?” (*Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium*, Monograph 46, February 2000), <http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Ecomog.html> (accessed 12 December 2009).

³³Stephan Kingebiel, Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Department at the German Development Institute (GDI), “Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture,” *African Security Review* 14, no 2 (2005).

³⁴Agence France-Presse (AFP), “Mbeki Wants Standby Force Prioritized,” *Business Day*, 23 May 2003.

³⁵Theophilus Y. Danjuma, “Nigeria’s Security Role in West Africa” (Lecture, 26 July 2009), <http://www.onlinenigeria.com/finance/?blurb=544> (accessed 23 November 2009).

³⁶Mark Weston, “The Dangerous Demographics of West Africa” (Lecture, International Challenges and Counter-Terrorism, 13 February 2009).

³⁷Yakhya Diop, “Counterinsurgency in West Africa: Non-lethal Activities” (Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2009), 2.

³⁸Paul Richards, “Youth War in Sierra Leone: Pacifying a Monster” (Lecture, Eleventh International Colloquium on Ethnic Construction and Political Violence, Toscana, Italy, 2 July 1999), 1.

³⁹Adebajo and Rashid, 246.

⁴⁰Alexandre Dubois, “West Africa, New Hub for Drug Trafficking Networks,” <http://www.mg.co.za/article/2006-05-13-west-africa-new-hub-for-drugtrafficking-networks> (accessed 8 September 2009).

⁴¹Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Lecture in Praia, Cape Verde, 28 October 2008).

⁴²Antonio Maria Costa (Address, International Conference “Drug Trafficking in Guinea Bissau,” Lisbon, Portugal, 19 December 2007), <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/assisting-guinea-bissau.html> (accessed 8 December 2009).

⁴³Chris Abbott and Thomas Phipps, “Beyond Dependence and Legacy: Sustainable Security in the Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Institute for Security Studies* (ISS) (May 2009), [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ7SFJHB/\\$file/ORG_May2009.pdf?openelement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/ASAZ7SFJHB/$file/ORG_May2009.pdf?openelement) (accessed 27 December 2009).

⁴⁴Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in ECOWAS Member States, signed on 31 October 1998 at Abuja.

⁴⁵ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), their Ammunition and other Related Materials, signed at Abuja on 14 June 2006. The convention entered force when it has been ratified by nine member states.

⁴⁶Alex Vines, “Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa,” *International Affairs* 81, no. 2 (2005): 341.

⁴⁷Ibid., 1.

⁴⁸Ty Wang, “Arms Transfers and Coup d'état: A study on Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 6 (1998): 669.

⁴⁹Abdoulaye Saine, “The Gambia’s Elected Autocrat Poverty, Peripherality and Political Instability 1994-2006,” *Armed Forces & Society* 34 (April 2008): 450.

⁵⁰Jimmy Kandeh, in *West African Security Challenge: Building Peace in a Troubled Region*, by Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail O. D. Rashid (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 145.

⁵¹David J. Francis, *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security System* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 141.

⁵²Ibid., 2.

⁵³Issaka A. Souaré, “Guerres Civiles et Coups d'Etat en Afrique de l'Ouest: Comprendre les Causes et Identifier des Solutions Possibles” (June 2007), 292.

CHAPTER 2

LITTERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Until the late eighties, there were few scholarly attempts about the understanding of the nature and source of security issues and their required solutions. To a very large extent, this situation has changed. As stated in chapter 1, since the end of the Cold War, the West African region is untiringly looking for means to solve its own security issues. As a result, ECOWAS, which seems to be one of the most experienced regional organizations within the African continent in terms of conflict management, provoked much analysis and many studies by local and foreign authors. This interest for the West African security issues was growing up during the 1990s when ECOMOG, a new military branch of ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. This growing interest from local or foreign scholars is also a way to show an increasing concern about issues related to the root causes of conflicts, especially in West Africa. So, it is interesting to see that there is sufficient material to get a good understanding of the West African countries continuing efforts to build a regional security.

The literature found can be broken into four categories:

1. The West African degrading security environment
2. The West African countries protracted will to address their own security issues
3. The embryonic ESF: critics and expected outcomes
4. The international community's support for regional peace management

West African Degrading Security Environment

Michael Ignatieff, a prominent liberal writer on conflict issues, underscores the lack of security which is the main characteristic of the region. For him, “war, like a virus, has worked its way into the very tissue of the Great Lakes region, part of West Africa. . . . It is the major employer, the chief economic activity. All power comes from the barrel of an AK-47.”¹ There is a lack of an efficient mechanism to address security issues within the region. In the book *A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*, Lansana Gberie, provides a background of the decade long bloody war in Sierra Leone. He argued that the Sierra Leonean war was a terrorist one on the civilian population of this small West African nation. He established a list of the issues undermining West African security environment. Among these, poverty and despair rotting the societies, violence and political thugs and the withering state institutions are the most critical.

In the 5131st Security Council Meeting on 25 February 2005, Koffi Annan added that “border areas are especially volatile, with populations at risk from illicit trafficking of drugs and weapons, recruitment of child soldiers, banditry, rape and environmental damage.” In *Youth war in Sierra Leone: Pacifying a Monster*, Paul Richards who had worked in West Africa for over thirty years has written at length on the causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone and indicated that social exclusion was the basic cause of the war. All these scholars insist on the roots causes of conflicts and the devastating consequences within the region.

Thus, in the Occasional Paper “From War to Peace,” sponsored by the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) of Ghana, Emmanuel Kwesi Aning (2001) asks for the

understanding of the root causes of conflicts in this degrading security environment in order to be able to address conflict issues. He suggests proactive strategies that can contribute to resolving and preventing conflicts if the political will is present. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 agenda for peace, emphasizes the need for continuing efforts to prevent contain and resolve conflicts. He insists on prevention by giving conceptual definitions on terms like warning systems and preventive diplomacy, especially in the West African region where the security in one state depends on the regional stability.

In the Paper “West Africa: from a Security Complex to a Security Community,” published in *African Security Review*, in 2005, Alhaji M. S. Bah, who specializes in regional security arrangements in West and Southern Africa, highlights the fact that instability in one state cannot be contained in that state alone, and poses grave danger to the security and stability of other states nearby. Hence, no member state can expect to isolate itself from the political crisis in another state. So, this literature calls for the establishment of a regional security mechanism.

Civil Militia: Africa's Intractable Security Menace by David J. Francis (2005) critically engages with the phenomenon of civil militias in Africa, especially the nature of threats and challenges they pose to national and human security. It questions why the African political scene is increasingly inundated with the activities of civil militias, examines the socio-political and economic conditions that trigger, encourage, and sustain the operations of civil militias, and investigates the dominant motivations of African civil militias. This book raises an interesting question for our study pertaining to the use of whatever possible to address the issues of regional security. “Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region” edited by Nicolas Florquin

and Eric G. Berman (2005), highlights the wide variety of armed groups that continue to threaten the region and examine some of the challenges linked to armed groups' armament. They review the region-wide mapping of armed groups and note that the effects of these groups' activities on human security are significant because they cause population displacement, weapons trafficking, and youth recruitment by warlords. The examination of the origins and composition of these armed groups show a close link with social exclusion, unshared natural resources, and failing leadership.

The West African Countries Protracted Will To Address
Their Own Security Issues

Mohamed Belmaki in his thesis "African Sub-Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: the Economic Community of West African States" (2005) examined the emerging role of ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization dealing with peacemaking missions on the post-Cold War period in West Africa. He focused on the first generation interventions of ECOMOG in undertaking peacekeeping missions in Liberia (1990 - 1997), Sierra Leone (1998 - 2000), Guinea Bissau (1998 - 1999), and the second generation of interventions in Liberia in 2003 and in Côte d'Ivoire (2003-2004). He assessed ECOWAS' strengths and limitations and stated that if the second generation interventions are almost not subject of critics, it is because they have benefited from the lessons of the first.

Klaus Van Walraven, in his book *Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Limitations and Possibilities*, (1998) contends that the civil war in Liberia compelled West African States to intervene in order to avoid the widespread effects of this conflict in the region. For him, this civil war gave ECOWAS the opportunity to create Africa's

first ever comprehensive security cooperation. The book proceeds from the position that sufficient early warning could enable governments and international organizations to intervene at an early stage, rather than waiting until disputes erupt into violence. It analyses the theoretical and practical complexities of timely warning and effective response in conflict resolution and also investigates the extent to which conflict prevention has become a concrete element in the policies of governments, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. All those elements showed the region's will to mend conflicts in its own backyard. But unfortunately, it seems difficult to obtain any gain from this accumulated experience within ECOWAS because of undermining rivalries among member states and, without any doubt, the hegemony of some Western countries on former colonies.

Gani Joses Yoroms and Emmanuel Kwesi Aning in the Paper, "West Africa Regional Security in the Post-Liberian Conflict Area: Issues and Perspectives," regret that these rivalries affected resolutions of conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. They analyze ECOWAS' security regime's first major effort towards enforcing compliance with its norms and values. They recommended three ways enabling ECOWAS to effectively and efficiently resolve conflicts within the region: the establishment of rule-enforcing mechanisms as a deterrence tool against trouble-makers, the impartiality and commitment of West African states on issues of conflicts, the adoption of accountable democratic governance

To emphasize the complexity of the region, Adekeye Adebayo and Ismail O. D. Rashid in *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region* made a retrospective journey through ECOWAS and the creation of mechanisms to address

security issues in the region and analyze the numerous challenges the region faces when building a regional security. They provide an opportunity to understand West Africa's security dilemmas by highlighting the link between the failures of economic integration and development, the challenge of democratization, governance and military insecurity, and cycle of violent conflict in West Africa.

The west African states' will to address their own security issues is more likely due to the fact that the UN and the international community were suffering from African peacekeeping fatigue, especially in the context of the end of the Cold War. The diminishing commitment to West African issues by Western countries gives no choice for the region other than addressing their own security problems. This situation led the region to set the conditions to intervene first in Liberia in 1990. Festus B. Aboagye in his book *ECOMOG: a Sub-regional experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia* (1999), insists on the internal issues causing ECOMOG to fail to achieve its objectives for so long. The understanding of these internal issues within ECOMOG especially in Liberia is the purpose of the assessment of ECOMOG intervention in chapter 4.

The Embryonic ESF: Critics and Expected Outcomes

This category of writings does not yet generate books. What is available are primarily magazines, scholarly journals, government documents, and transcripts of interviews. It tries to answer some questions like: what is the readiness level of the West Africa brigade? How it should be shaped? What are the expected roles of the developed countries?

The literature identified some critics about the ESF. The report, “Lessons Learned from the African Mission in Darfur (AMID),” stemming from the discussions held among more than fifty senior police and military officers from African countries and partner nations and organizations at a seminar in Accra, Ghana in October 2006, identified some critics about the ESF. First, ESF development has been primarily militarily driven, whereas experience demonstrates that Peace Support Operations (PSO) can be complex endeavors, also requiring the contribution of police and civilian experts, and recourse to political decision-makers. Second, the ASF Workshops have focused largely on the tactical level of PSOs, whereas, as the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) shows, PSOs cannot succeed without proper planning and guidance at strategic and operational levels. Third, inevitably, there will be a quasi-total dependence on external partners to finance missions, with attendant constraints, delays, and political ambiguities. Fearing the outbreak of rivalries among member states, some scholars underscore the importance of unity and cooperation. Financial contributions and payment of dues should be prioritized and honored by all member states in order to diminish this dependence on international support.

For Amponsem-Boateng, in “Prospects of the Economic Community of West African States Standby Force,” to make the dream of the ASF a reality, the sub-regions must meet the requirements in the roadmap. Though ECOWAS has made significant progress towards establishing a viable sub-regional peace support capability, it needs to improve on its operational capacity. The major recommendations are that ECOWAS should address the problems that it encountered during previous ECOMOG missions and also use the P3 initiative, an agreement between France Great Britain and the US to

coordinate their supporting program, as a platform for external support for ECOWAS peace support operations.

In his thesis “Challenges of Regional Collective Security: Economic Community of West African States Standby Force: a Case Study,” Ibrahim Miftah contends that although, ECOWAS has demonstrated the willingness and capability to restore peace in the region, it needs to overcome numerous challenges in its quest for collective security. He made strategic and operational recommendations on how best ECOWAS can deal with the challenges of employing the ESF to support regional collective security. The major recommendations are that ECOWAS member states must be more committed to funding ESF’s operations, and that ECOWAS must introduce a training and evaluation unit that would cater for training standardization and evaluation of all troops serving in the ESF. An assessment of the embryonic ESF will be conducted through a measure of effectiveness process.

The International Community’s Support for the Regional Peace Management

The literature about the international community support for the region’s commitment to its own security issues comes mainly from the African scholars. They typically criticize the insufficiency of support from Western countries. Many West African writers on the topic are aware of the fact that the international assistance for the regional conflict resolution mechanism is critical. According to most of the articles researched, the assistance to the regional conflict resolution comes either from the European Union (EU) or from the United States (US).

The US provides training and long-term capacity building programs such as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Under the Bush Administration, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was transformed into ACOTA, which trains military trainers and equips African national militaries to conduct peace support operations and humanitarian relief. The program's goal is to increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as human rights, interaction with civil society, international law, military staff skills, and small unit operations. The ACOTA program has a growing record of supporting African militaries that have afterwards participated in peacekeeping or peace support activities throughout the continent. But this program is not implemented in the whole region. The main partners in West Africa are Benin, Ghana, Mali and Senegal.

France has its program called *Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix* (RECAMP). Currently, this program tends to be generalized through the EU. Some exercises supported by Euro-RECAMP, the European Union-French initiative have been scheduled with the ASF. For many years, the United Kingdom (UK) has felt that it makes good sense for the international community to maximize the use of the range of expertise and experience available from the numerous and varied practitioners in the peacekeeping field, including some African states. As a result, the UK has been involved in helping to train a number of countries in preparation for deployment on peacekeeping duties. The UK contributes with a Britain Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT). For the region, this program is based in Ghana.

But there is a newcomer in this scene: China. China hosts many Africans in its military training schools. Recently there have been many scholarly articles on China in

West Africa as Africa has recently become strategically important to the Chinese, mainly for economic reasons. The US and China, the leading consumers of oil in the world, have devised strategies through Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) tools to secure and expand their interests. The strategies being adopted by both countries in pursuing their interests in Africa differ in principle and implementation. Frederick Dankyi Ntiri, in his thesis “The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China in Africa: Promoting Stability or Chaos” states that unfortunately this US-China competition in the region looks like the one during the Cold War between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). Many conflicts in Africa have been linked to the ways through which the US and the USSR pursued their policies in Africa during the Cold War. He thinks that the likelihood of the Cold War mechanics is being replicated with the increased presence of the US and China in Africa. The research concludes that although the Cold War model cannot be applied to this new competition, there are similarities that cause concern. He outlines some recommendations to be adopted to prevent intrastate conflicts or at least to minimize their effects: the influx of weapons into Africa to protect superpower interests should be curtailed; the US and China should both be encouraged to avoid appealing to religion and ethnicity in their interaction with the African society; the US and China should avoid domestic national interest biases in handling Security Council matters relating to the region.

Ricardo Rene Laremont in his book, *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, agrees with the ECOWAS move in using ECOMOG in order to intervene in conflicts within West Africa, even though ECOWAS is primarily an economic organization. He adds that the creation of effective security mechanisms for

conflict resolutions can foster the region's stability and development. For him, former external actors are no longer willing to directly contribute troops as part of military intervention forces in Africa. The programs offered by the developed countries are indirect ways of compelling Africa to take care of its own security issues.

In 2006, Seth Kaplan, a foreign policy analyst, in an article "West African Integration: a New Paradigm?" in *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2006) maintains that helping long-troubled regions such as West Africa requires nothing less than embracing a new development paradigm. Instead of simply continuing to pump billions annually into the region's many dysfunctional regimes, local leaders and the developed world should focus on regionalism and help address conflicts.

The book by Niagale Bagayoko-Penon, *Afrique, Les Stratégies Françaises et Américaines*, offers a reflection on the type of conflict that we see today in the region of West Africa and the mechanisms of prevention and management of conflicts that prevail there. It also provides an analytical framework for methodological strategies as they are now designed in France and the United States, highlighting parameters such as strategic cultures of both countries.

Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan in their essay, "The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects" talk about the G8 promise to support the AU proposal through funding, training, and enhanced co-ordination of activities. With the financing issue far from resolved, the AU is likely to depend on the strength and goodwill of lead nations and donations from the international community. Many G8 partners, and indeed other donors, already have established extensive, ongoing programs with African nations and institutions to support the development of African capacities to undertake complex peace

support operations and related activities. However, the G8 recognizes the need to enhance co-ordination among donors and with African partners to avoid duplication of effort and ensure cost effectiveness. Enhanced co-ordination will also help channel individual and collective efforts and build complementarities among programs and partnerships.

Finally, the state of publication on the topic is sufficient enough to enable the researcher to produce a good thesis which may contribute to a better realization of the regional security necessary for economic development.

¹Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 5.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter presents the research design methodology utilized in the conduct of this study. As quantitative measures cannot adequately describe and interpret the West African security issues, this thesis will use a qualitative methodology focusing on “any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of qualification.”¹

Methodology and Hypothesis

The qualitative methodology used during the conduct of this research is the most suitable for the thesis. It enables to gain an in-depth understanding of the ECOWAS historical commitment to security-related issues by providing new perspectives on efficient methods the region needs to explore in order to boost the efficiency of the embryonic ESF. By collecting information from both primary and secondary materials, the thesis evaluates ECOWAS’ continuing actions to set the conditions necessary for regional stability, an implied task for economic development in West Africa. The qualitative research method uses case studies. A case study research method is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.² The purpose of the different case studies in this thesis is an attempt to shed light on past regional interventions since the hypothesis that the study seeks to validate is that building an efficient regional security mechanism requires considering the lessons learned from previous ECOMOG interventions. This assessment goes beyond the simple

prospects of short terms peace achievements. It identifies the critical requirements expected to come from the West African states, individually and collectively and the suitable nature of the support from the traditional extra-regional partners.

Case Study Selection

The end of the Cold War witnessed a bizarre situation. While the post-Cold War era promised a decline in the likelihood of great-power confrontation, intra-state conflicts within Africa skyrocketed. At the same time, the commitment of traditional actors to intervene in Africa was on the wane. As a result, ECOWAS exclusively established to promote economic integration within West Africa, ventured into the field of security. Its military arm, ECOMOG, finally intervened five times. Thus, West Africa became the most experienced region, even beyond Africa, in terms of peace management. It would be highly valuable to take into account the lessons learned from regional interventions while building the ESF as a new security architecture. The case studies will focus on three of these five ECOMOG interventions: Liberia (1990-1997), Guinea Bissau (1998), and Côte d'Ivoire (2002). The selected three interventions provide a suitable base line to test the hypothesis of the thesis. They have different characteristics in terms of actors and intervention scenario.

In August 1990, having assessed the Liberian conflict's risks and dire consequences that might hinder the whole regional security, ECOWAS employed an ad hoc military intervention force known as ECOMOG. Today, this intervention has become the most controversial and protracted operation ever conducted by ECOWAS. ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia was terminated after the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections on 19 July 1997. The Liberian conflict is important as a case

study because it is the first time that an African regional organization intervened militarily in the internal affairs of one of its members. Moreover, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) is the first United Nations peacekeeping mission undertaken in cooperation with a regional peacekeeping operation (ECOMOG) already set up by another organization. So the case study may give the opportunity to measure the possibility of a UN-ECOMOG joint mission.

The conflict of Guinea-Bissau in 1998 is the second selected case study. The crisis broke out while the regional force was outstretched by the Sierra Leonean conflict. The Guinea-Bissau intervention is useful as a case study for two reasons. First, it is the first time that Nigeria, which provided the men and money that fueled the ECOMOG locomotive in Liberia and Sierra Leone, was absent. Second, the Guinea-Bissau crisis witnessed the sole intervention of ECOMOG without any UN observers or peacekeepers. As a result, the choice of Guinea-Bissau as a case study is worthy as it assessed the ability of the region to conduct and sustain an operation by its own.

The Ivorian conflict offered a quite different scenario. The main difference between this crisis and the former ones is that ECOMOG was not the first force to be deployed. Military operations of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) came after intervention from a French force called operation *Licorne*. The regional contingent operated with the French force before being absorbed by the United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI): this UN mission is still going on. In addition, the efforts to reconcile the belligerents were done by a multitude of actors including the AU, ECOWAS, France, and the UN.

Input Variables Selection and Explanation

After a thorough examination of available background materials on the regional security issues, four input variables were identified for each case study. These input variables included the adoption of UN peacekeeping principles, the mechanism of regional force's deployment, the capabilities within the deployed force, and the extra-regional support. The case studies assigned each input variable with a numerical rating as a ranking criterion in a matrix form (table 2). The input variables are graded from 0 to 4 with 4 being the best possible value. In order to be accurate in grading them, each of these input variables is divided into four input sub-variables. The addition of the four sub-variables' grades provides a final grade for each of the input variables. A closer look at each input variable with its sub-variables and why it was selected is briefly explained next.

The Adoption of UN Peacekeeping Principles

The UN identified some principles it thinks are the main critical elements of its successes while conducting Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) around the world, especially in West Africa. Since ECOWAS is a regional organization authorized by the Chapter VII of the UN charter, its processes to handle PKOs are more likely to be based on the world body's principles. The grading of the variable pertaining to the adoption of the UN peacekeeping principles is completed through four input sub-variables including: the level of impartiality of the intervening force; its legitimacy; the success of obtaining consent agreement from the warring parts; and the ethical behavior of the force. For the purpose of this analysis, the working definitions of the input sub-variables are in

appendix A. Each of these input sub-variables is rated from 0 to 1 depending on their presence or not within the deployed force.

The Mechanism of Deployment

Tactical, operational and strategic operations are three nested levels. Success at tactical and operational levels depends on the soundness of the strategic options. From a regional prospective, the mechanism of deployment usually starts with a diplomatic approach creating a mandate to respond to the crisis. Depending on the effects of diplomatic efforts, a more robust approach, including military intervention, can be adopted. The input variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment is measured through four input sub-variables including: the regional responsiveness following the outbreak of a crisis; the regional commitment; the clarity and feasibility of the mandate; and the regional understanding of the conflict. For the purpose of this analysis, the working definitions of the input sub-variables are in appendix A. Each of these inputs sub-variables is rated from 0 to 1 depending on their right fulfillment or shortfall within ECOWAS.

Capabilities within the Deployed Force

Capabilities are the ability to perform actions. As they apply to human capital, capabilities are the sum of expertise and capacity. Along with capacity, expertise which is acquired trough training and experience is critical to succeed in a given operation. Capacity enables suitable equipment and expertise provides the required skills to efficiently use that equipment. Today, the most significant debate about any West African project is about whether or not the region is capable to handle it by itself. The third input

variable, capabilities, is measured through four input sub-variables including: the regional force's logistical aptitude; its command and control structure; the tactical and operational gain on the ground; and its abilities to work with Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other multinational organizations like the UN or the AU. For the purpose of this analysis, the working definitions of the input sub-variables are in appendix A. Each of these inputs sub-variables were rated from 0 to 1 depending on their presence or not within the deployed force.

The Extra-Regional Support

The external support helps build legitimacy and strengthens the regional efforts to address a conflict. As the regional resources are limited in terms of PKO, the support of the extra-regional actors may become important, especially if their actions are complementary instead of being conflicting. It is also important to keep in mind that their interests usually dictated their actions. The last input variable, external support, is assessed through four input sub-variables including: the actions and support by the OAU/AU; the UN; the US; and Europe. For the purpose of this analysis, the working definitions of the input sub-variables are in appendix A. Each of these input sub-variables will be rated from 0 to 1 depending on their presence or not during the different case studies.

Display of Inputs Variable Results

Table 2. Sample Table of Matrix for Scoring Input Variables.

Variables Operation	Peacekeeping Principles				Mechanism of Deployment				Capabilities within ECOMOG				Extra Regional Support														
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P											
Case Study X	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1											
	Total: 0-4				Total: 0-4				Total: 0-4				Total: 0-4														
	Legends:																										
A: Impartiality B: Legitimacy C: Consent agreement of the warring parties D: Ethical behavior of the deployed force E: Regional responsiveness F: The regional commitment to the conflict G: The clarity and the feasibility of ECOMOG's mandate H: The regional understanding of the conflict I: ECOMOG logistical aptitude J: Command and control K: Tactical and operational gain on the ground L: ECOMOG abilities to work with NGOs and the UN M: The OAU/AU N: The UN O: The US P: The EU																											

Source: Created by Author.

Outcome Variable Selection and Explanation

In order to identify key lessons learned from previous regional operations, the main objective of using the case study is to compare the results of the input variables with the PKO outcome of each of the three selected case studies. It enables one to assess the utility of the PKO in each case study and to know which of the four input variables are the most critical to produce an effective PKO outcome. The PKO outcome variable is

divided into two sub-outcomes including the impact of regional intervention on regional security and the resolution and prevention of conflict reoccurrence. Each of these two sub-outcome variables are graded from 0 to 2 (see table 3). Thus, the entire PKO outcome variable is scored from 0 to 4 in order to be easily comparable with the input variables also scored from 0 to 4. A closer look at each sub-outcome variable and why it was selected is briefly explained next.

PKO Impact on Regional Security

Usually, PKO is implemented to bring peace and stability to provide the condition for a long-term political settlement to be agreed to. It is quite clear that the underlying objective for ECOWAS interventions in the region, especially in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire was to prevent conflicts from negatively impacting on the security of the region, endangering its stability. The PKO impact of each of the three selected case studies on regional security is measured holistically through the general peace environment in the region, the nature of interstate relationships, the existence of active peace spoilers and efficient solution over traditional issues such as arms trafficking and porous borders. This first outcome sub-variable, PKO impact on regional security is rated from 0 to 2 depending on the nature of the PKO impact on the regional security.

Resolution and Prevention of Conflict Reoccurrence

The resolution of disagreements underlying a conflict and the prevention of its reoccurrence is a significant measure of effectiveness (MOE) for a deployed peacekeeping force. Peace should be definitively achieved before a peacekeeping mission is over. The reoccurrence of a conflict after significant efforts, in terms of casualties and

financing, is a failure for an organization and a peacekeeping force. This second outcome sub-variable, resolution and prevention of conflict reoccurrence is rated from 0 to 2 depending on the outbreak of a conflict similar or linked to the case study in question.

Display of Outcome Variable Results

Table 3. Sample Table of Matrix for Scoring Outcome Variable.

Outcomes Operation		ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes	
Case Study X	Impact on Regional Security	Resolution and Prevention of Conflict reoccurrence	
	0-2	0-2	
	Total: 0-4		

Rigor in the Analysis

As stated in chapter 2, the literature on the West African regional security is quite large. However, this literature deals with the selected three case studies with an uneven manner in terms of quantity. For instance, the operations in Liberia generated a significant amount of scholarly articles while the remaining conflicts (Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire) have limited coverage. In spite of this fact, the research does allow one to conduct comparative case studies to validate the hypothesis by ultimately identifying the conditions needed for effective regional security architecture. As the specific context of each conflict is important, each of the three case studies started with a brief presentation of the country and an explanatory background of the conflict. From a rigor standpoint, by

scoring the table of the matrices above (tables 2 and 3) the final result of each case study remains hidden until each assessment is completed in order to reduce the author's ability to influence the results.

Utility of Results

The case studies would be unnecessary if they are only content with showing results. Even though it is important to see through the display of the final results whether or not the regional mechanism improved itself as it moved from an operation to another, it is also critical to highlight the problems that need to be fixed in the prospects of an efficient ESF. With this end in view, additional studies are conducted to identify the suitable actions to be taken by both the region as a homogeneous body and the traditional extra regional partners.

The case studies ultimately serve as criteria to adequately test the validity of the hypothesis in order to find answers to the secondary questions in the conclusions in Chapter 5. The secondary questions are repeated as follows:

1. In terms of regional security, which ECOMOG operations were successful or less successful and why?
2. What are the required local actions to be taken in order to fix things that used to hinder the efficiency of former ECOMOG interventions?
3. How can the ESF respond efficiently to regional security issues?
4. To what extent can West African countries have its traditional partners such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) help it support its efforts in building greater regional security?

¹Anselm L. Strauss and Juliet M. Corbin, *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory, Procedure, and Techniques* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publication, Inc, 1990), 17.

²Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1984), 23.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This chapter scrutinizes three of the five ECOMOG interventions in the conflicts occurring within the region. West Africa is the most affected region in Africa in terms of brutal and intractable conflicts. The end of the Cold War played a significant role as it changed the international environment, especially in Africa, due to it having been a theater of most of the former proxy wars. Like the conflict in the Balkans, West African conflicts followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As a result, the nineties were characterized by an increased number of peacekeeping missions overstretching the capacity of the UN, obliged to scale down its interventions, especially in intrastate conflicts like those occurring in West Africa. From a western standpoint also, Africa was no longer a significant priority. Thus, Africans had to take care of their own issues.

In West Africa, the fact is that there is a group of sixteen states which created an economic arrangement, called ECOWAS, in order to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity. No one during that time thought that ECOWAS, established primarily, if not solely, for the facilitation of economic integration would become an instrument of guaranteeing security in the region. ECOWAS moved into the security field as its member states understood that “the dominance of security issues and concerns in regional politics make it more imperative that economic relations be harnessed on a sound political and security foundation as the collapse of law and order render the pursuit of the objectives of economic integration difficult, if not impossible.”¹

In spite of many critiques associated with ECOWAS's interventions, the ad hoc regional force, ECOMOG, was sent five times within the region in order to restore order. It is important to highlight the fact that the regional force almost always deployed at a time when there was a parallel ECOMOG operation still going on. ECOMOG was first challenged in the Liberian quagmire when it intervened in 1990. Then, before the peace was decisively achieved in Liberia, the regional force set the conditions to deploy in Sierra Leone from 1998 to 1999. The outbreak of the Guinea-Bissau war again compelled it to a short deployment. With the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, ECOMOG implemented its first deployment of the twenty first century followed later by the second Liberian crisis.

Case Study 1: The Liberian Conflict (1989-1997)

Lying on the Atlantic in the southern part of West Africa, Liberia is bordered by Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire (see figure 3). It was founded in 1821 as a result of the American Colonization Society (ACS), a private organization, to settle freed American slaves in West Africa.² While Liberia has often been hailed as one of only two African nations never to be colonized, the English-speaking Americo-Liberians, constituting only 5 percent of Liberia's estimated population of 2 millions, have historically constituted the ruling class dominating the political, economic, social and cultural life of the nation for over a century. The indigenous Liberians, who largely outnumbered the Americo-Liberians, belonged to five main tribes: Gola, Mandingo, Gio, Krahn and Mano. On 12 April 1980, Samuel Kanyon Doe, a former Master Sergeant in the Army and leader of the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDLP), became Liberia's first indigenous President after he assassinated the last Americo-Liberian President, William Tolbert.




Figure 3. Map of Liberia

Source: Lonely Planet, Liberia, <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/libera> (accessed 27 May 2010).

Samuel Doe's National Democratic Party increasingly adopted an ethnic outlook during its days in power. Members of his Krahn ethnic group dominated both military and political life in Liberia and the other ethnic groups were neglected.³ The Liberian conflict began on December 1989 when Doe's brutal dictatorship was challenged by a number of exiled leaders including Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Because of the extraordinarily brutal style of Samuel Doe's reign, most Liberians felt increasingly unsafe and decided to join the NPFL which they saw as a liberation movement.⁴ But later, one of Taylor's major allies, Prince Yormie Johnson, broke away from the NPFL and created his own movement, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).⁵ These two insurgent movements made rapid military gains forcing Doe to request ECOWAS's assistance to help him restore normality in Liberia. The ECOMOG force landed in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, on 24 August 1990.

As the war continued, other factions appeared. First, there was the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), originally led by Raleigh Seekiewas and formed in June 1991 by former fighters of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and other supporters of the late President Doe who had taken refuge in Guinea and Sierra Leone. After fighting alongside the Sierra Leonean Army against the Revolutionary Unified Front (RUF) insurgency, ULIMO forces entered western Liberia in September 1991 and effectively broke into two competing wings in 1994: ULIMO-J, a Krahn faction led by General Roosevelt Johnson, and ULIMO-K, more Mandingo-based, under Alhaji Kromah. Another faction was the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), a predominantly Krahn organization with other ethnic groups who had suffered under NPFL occupation. It was led by Dr. George Boley and emerged in the wake of the 1993 Cotonou Accord, partly as a proxy force for the AFL. Finally, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia - Central Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), a breakaway group led by former key NPFL figures Sam Dokie and Tom Woewiyu, emerged in mid-1994.⁶

The Adoption of UN PKO Principles

Impartiality (A)

One of the core principles followed by UN PKO is impartiality. Impartiality means that neither side should gain unfair advantages as a result of the activities of a PKO. As stated by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, it is, however, important to make it clear that “impartiality does not - and must not - mean neutrality in the face of evil.”⁷ In other words, being impartial does not necessarily mean being inactive when universal human rights are challenged in conflicts wherever they may be. During the Liberian conflict, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso were themselves

sympathetic toward the NPFL. Côte d'Ivoire's President Boigny was angry at Samuel Doe who killed Boigny's daughter's family-in-law during the 1980 brutal coup led by Doe. In December 1989, Liberian rebel forces of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), crossed into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire with the support of Boigny and Burkina Faso.⁸ Thus, several key players in this conflict had very clear agendas they were pursuing that directly clashed with this principle of impartiality.

On the other hand, Nigerian policy towards ECOMOG was colored by its deep antipathy toward Taylor's NPFL and its unconditional support of Samuel Doe, who was considered a close friend of the then Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida. According to Christopher Tuck, Taylor's actions, including the killings of up to 1,000 Nigerian nationals in Monrovia in 1990, and his close links with Nigeria's regional rival Côte d'Ivoire, threatened Nigerian interests in the region.⁹ In order to foster the early defeat of the NPFL, Nigerians supplied weapons and ammunition to Doe.¹⁰ Even once Doe had been killed, Nigeria continued to provide support for factions opposed to the NPFL, including the AFL, INPFL, ULIMO, and LPC. These factions had welcomed ECOMOG not so much as fellow African peacekeepers, but as possible allies against Taylor's NPFL.¹¹ As a result, both Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire broke with a cardinal principle Sashi Tharoor, former UN under Secretary-General for public affairs, sees as "the oxygen of peacekeeping."¹² For the Liberian conflict, impartiality, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 5).

Legitimacy (B)

The impartiality of the West African countries that took side during the Liberian conflict raised another significant issue: the legitimacy of ECOMOG as an intervening

force. The ECOMOG legitimacy to intervene in Liberia was especially challenged by the Francophone states. They argued that an organization established primarily, if not solely, for the facilitation of economic integration, had no mandate to take on political and security-related responsibilities, even for humanitarian reasons. However, for the defense of the legitimacy of ECOMOG intervention, two arguments can be brought. First, it is quite impossible to achieve the economical objectives ECOWAS tasked itself without addressing the implied task pertaining to regional security. Second, when this force was first dispatched to Liberia in 1990, the magnitude of the Liberian crisis and the human suffering in the country made it difficult to challenge the need of the force, despite indications that some of the planners had motives other than the benevolent ones that were advanced to justify its deployment.¹³ For the Liberian conflict, legitimacy, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

Consent Agreement of the Warring Parties (C)

As a result of the controversial ECOMOG impartiality and the issue of legitimacy, ECOWAS did not succeed in obtaining from all the warring parties the agreement for an intervening force. While Doe and other Liberian factions accepted the intervention of ECOMOG, Charles Taylor, whose force were at the gates of Monrovia and who suspected that the intervention was designed to cheat him out of victory because he had no trust in the Nigeria's dominant role in this regional force, rejected it.¹⁴ Tom Woweiyu, a spokesman for Taylor's NPFL, had embarked on a tour of West African capitals to try to persuade leaders to oppose the presence of the international force in Liberia.¹⁵ It is important to stress the close link between ECOMOG's controversial

impartiality and the lack of agreement on ECOMOG intervention from the warring parties. As early as October 1990, the failure of obtaining warring parties' agreement was clear especially when ECOMOG was seen by Taylor as assuming a combative role in alliance with the INPFL and AFL.¹⁶ By ignoring the consent of the warring parties, ECOWAS missed the opportunity to set the conditions for a viable and more effective intervention. For the Liberian conflict, consent of the warring parties, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 5).

Ethical Behavior of ECOMOG in Liberia (D)

The ethos within ECOMOG was controversial. There have been many reports alleging ECOMOG's involvement in corrupt practices. The poor situation of the troops on the ground brought about temptation, and sometimes the necessity of illicit mining, looting, thieving, and smuggling. Even though ECOMOG's behavior was stellar, when compared to that of the warring factions, its soldiers too often mistreated Liberian citizens. The questionable role of the ECOMOG force is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that in Liberia, it became known as "Every Commodity and Movable Object Gone."¹⁷ According to Morten Boas, several ECOMOG officers made fortunes from the warlord economy as the ECOMOG forces seized control of Liberia's main ports and gained control of trading networks.¹⁸ Moreover, ECOMOG alliance with some of the warring factions characterized by their shortfall in terms of human rights raised significant concerns about the regional force's commitment to ethical behavior. Because they aided ECOMOG, these factions generally had a free pass in their controversial

operations. For the Liberian conflict, ethical behavior, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Mechanism of Deployment

Regional Responsiveness (E)

The Liberian conflict really started on Christmas 1989 when the NPFL attacked the Armed Forces of Liberia in its attempt to overthrow President Doe. The regional force, ECOMOG, finally landed on 24 August 1990, that is to say eight months after the outbreak of the conflict. Eight months are enough for insurgencies to kill thousands of civilians. A mix of both official and hidden motives split ECOWAS into two conflicting groups with contrasting geopolitical objectives between the Francophone and the Anglophone states. The Francophone member states challenged the legitimacy of ECOMOG because they suspected Nigeria for using ECOMOG to assert itself in the region and to gain political credits from Western nations. They preferred dialogue and negotiations, which suited Côte d'Ivoire, because Charles Taylor was on the verge of a military victory.¹⁹ On the other hand, Anglophone states wanted to intervene as quickly as possible.

ECOWAS hastily dusted off the non-aggression treaty which its members signed on 22 April 1978. Besides declarations encouraging negotiations among the warring parties in Liberia, ECOWAS officially addressed the crisis in May 1990 with the establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), a body comprising of Nigeria, Ghana, the Gambia, Mali and Togo.²⁰ The committee met in Banjul on 7 August 1990 and finally decided to intervene. The force was initially built with troops from Ghana, Guinea (unique francophone country), Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Nigeria.

Among other reasons, debates about the ECOMOG's legal foundations and diplomatic efforts to get the NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, peacefully welcome the peacekeepers significantly delayed the deployment of the regional force. For the Liberian conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional responsiveness, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Regional Commitment to the Liberian conflict (F)

In spite of the division among ECOWAS member states involved in the Liberian conflict, it is not arguable that the region lacked commitment to the Liberian conflict. ECOMOG's undeniable commitment had two underlying causes. First, “the nature, scale and impact of the conflict and the crises the Liberian crisis engendered, were so deliberate and repugnant to human sensibilities that ignoring them is intolerable as fearing their repetition”²¹ There was a fear within the region with probable spillover fighting, increased refugees, and deliberate destabilization of neighboring states. Second, the undemocratic nature of most of the contributing states, which were ruled by military regimes or dictators helped consolidate this commitment, once the force has been deployed. This was in spite of the significant number of wounded in action (WIA) or killed in action (KIA), the financial costs, and the extension of the war.

However, this commitment was very marginal as only 5 out of 15 member states agreed to contribute to ECOMOG troops even though later 6 other countries including Senegal, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and Togo provided troops. In addition, this commitment was too eagerly observed because of conflicting interests at stake with crippling effects among ECOWAS member states. For the Liberian conflict, the second

criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional commitment, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Clarity and the Feasibility of ECOMOG's Mandate (G)

The ECOMOG mandate in Liberia was "to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire and restore law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections."²² This mandate may seem too vague, because there is no clear rule of engagement (ROE). An intervening force, by international law, is always permitted the right of self-defense against those who renege on its commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine the peacekeeping force by violence. When ECOMOG landed in Monrovia on 24 August 1990, there was no peace to keep because the warring parties continued the fight each other and ECOMOG itself became the target of Taylor's force. As a result of both the unclear mandate and the non-achievement by ECOWAS of a peace agreement prior to the deployment of ECOMOG, the regional force employed a peace enforcement mandate based on the military situation on the ground.²³

What was needed in Liberia was a Chapter VII-type peace enforcement mandate because of the multidimensional nature of the peacekeeping and peace support operations challenges. However, the key point of consideration in ECOMOG's mandate in the Liberian conflict is that the mandate cautiously avoided an exit date even though ECOWAS initially thought that 6 months would be enough. Instead, the only exit condition was the holding of fair and free elections. In addition, for ECOWAS's defense, the usual vagueness of a UN PKO was famously highlighted by Dag Hammarskjold, former UN Secretary General, when he described it as "Chapter VI and-a-half" operation

lying between the chapter VI and VII. For the Liberian conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the clarity of the mandate, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Regional Understanding of the Conflict (H)

With the proliferation of cease-fires, accords and agreement, it is opportune to question ECOWAS's understanding of the nature of the Liberian conflict. At least 12 accords and agreements had been signed by the conflicting factions without almost any results. The understanding by ECOWAS leadership that most of the warlords were more interested in personal power and wealth came at a very late stage in the Liberian conflict management process. It took ECOWAS almost three years to figure out the Cotonou Accord which brought a better prospect by providing for a cease-fire, demobilization and election. Moreover, a lack of understanding of the conflict and its root causes led ECOWAS to hastily assemble only 3,000 troops to solve the Liberian nightmare.

The civil war's immediate root causes were Samuel Doe's military regime and his failed promise to institute democratic reforms and return the country back to civilian rule after the 1980 coup which brought him to power. Even at the strategic and tactical levels, a shortfall in the understanding of the Liberian conflict led to a building of an Order of Battle (OB) which was not suited for a counterinsurgency operation. The main battle tanks were ill-suited for Liberia's heavy forest interior.²⁴ ECOMOG initially assumed that its superior firepower of their conventional, professional force would a priori intimidate the ragtag NPFL.²⁵ For the Liberian conflict, this fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional understanding of the conflict, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Capabilities within the Deployed Force

ECOMOG Logistical Aptitude (I)

In spite of the significant efforts on the part of Nigeria, ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia clearly exposed the logistical weaknesses of the region. First, there were poor sea and air lift capabilities within ECOMOG. In mid 1995, ECOMOG's only helicopter was for the Force Commander's personal travel.²⁶ The tremendous geographical size of West Africa and the very limited road network in Liberia made crucial the operational and tactical use of helicopters, especially in terms of air-to-ground support assets. Second, the lack of standardization of equipment, arms and ammunition caused significant sustainment and command and control issues because every national detachment within ECOMOG joined the force with its own equipment believed to be necessary. Third, ECOMOG was hastily deployed to Liberia before detailed logistical and financial arrangements were made. The sole initial agreement was for each contingent to fund its own troops for the first month after which time all ECOWAS members would assume responsibility for ECOMOG.²⁷ These logistical shortfalls created poor conditions for the troops who were inadequately paid. For the Liberian conflict, logistical aptitude, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 5).

Command and Control in the Liberian Conflict (J)

ECOMOG's command and control structure was in theory headed by the Force Commander who had the operational control of the mission.²⁸ Beside significant language differences among the troops, the intervention in Liberia was characterized by untimely changes of Force Commanders. Beside Major General Inienger, none of the 8

Force Commanders in Liberia completed a fifteen-month term command. (see table 1)

This situation posed significant challenges for the continuity and the coherence of the operation as the Force Commander usually received vaguely worded political directives he translated into action.

Moreover, ECOMOG was not successful in operating a unified command. Each country had a say in the disposition of its national forces. National commanders did not necessarily seek clearance from the ECOMOG Force Commander or the ECOWAS Secretariat. Instead, they communicated and received orders directly from their home governments, creating conflicting instructions. This excessive control by home governments hindered the efficiency of ECOMOG because it had a direct effect on the different units' movement and maneuver. There have been instances where contingent units were pulled out of their areas of deployment without the approval or even the knowledge of the Force Commander, thus endangering the deployment of flanking contingents.²⁹ For the Liberian conflict, command and control, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 5).

Table 4. ECOMOG Force Commander during the Liberian Conflict

No	Rank	Name (Nationality)	From	To
1	LT. GEN	Arnold Quainoo (Ghana)	August 90	September 90
2	MAJ. GEN	Joshua Dongoyaro (Nigeria)	September 90	February 91
3	MAJ. GEN	Raymond M. Kupolati (Nigeria)	February 91	September 91
4	MAJ. GEN	Ishaya Bakut (Nigeria)	September 91	October 92
5	MAJ. GEN	Adetunji Olurin (Nigeria)	October 92	October 93
6	MAJ. GEN	John N. Shagaya (Nigeria)	October 93	December 93
7	MAJ. GEN	John M. Inienger (Nigeria)	December 93	August 96
8	MAJ. GEN	Samuel V. L. Malu (Nigeria)	August 96	January 98

Source: David Francis, *Uniting Africa: building regional peace and security systems* Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, 174.

ECOMOG Tactical and Operational Gain on the Ground (K)

At the very beginning of its operations in Liberia, ECOMOG faced significant difficulties hampering its ability to separate the belligerents. First, ECOMOG did not succeed in preventing Samuel Doe being killed as early as sixteen days after the West African force landed in Monrovia. Indeed, on 9 September 1990 Doe, on a visit to ECOMOG-headquarters in Monrovia, was captured, tortured, mutilated and finally brutally killed by Johnson and his men.³⁰ This embarrassing event led to the replacement of Lieutenant General Quainoo as ECOMOG commander. The killing of President Doe worsened the already confused situation since at that time every warring group's leader claimed the position of President before the arrival of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by Professor Amos Sawyer in 1990.

However, the first major gain of the force was the evacuation of tens of thousands of foreigners and Liberians alike in neighboring countries with the Ghanaian vessel Intano River.³¹ By restoring a relative degree of order, ECOMOG succeeded in setting the conditions necessary to compel the warring parties to join the negotiating table. This

led to the Bamako Ceasefire on 28 November 1990. In January 1993, ECOMOG regained control of Monrovia and its outskirts after the NPFL launched an unexpected attack on Monrovia in October 1992 known as “Operation Octopus.”³² This successful establishment of a safe haven by ECOMOG around Monrovia encouraged aid agencies to return to the country. In spite of the high number of factions, ECOMOG carried out disarmament tasks. According to Dowyaro, Office of the Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army, by 7 February 1997, a total of 13,167 small arms, 1,628,584 rounds of mixed ammunition, 6 field guns, and 4,145 bombs were seized by the peacekeepers (UNOMIL and ECOMOG).³³ For the Liberian conflict, tactical and operational gain on the ground, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

ECOMOG Abilities to Work with NGOs and the UN (L)

NGOs and the UN are the two groups of organizations that worked with ECOMOG at one time or another during the Liberian crisis. The NGOs came back in Liberia after ECOMOG succeeded in securing Monrovia at the end of 1990. At the beginning there was a good relationship between NGOs and ECOMOG. But later this harmonious relationship was severely strained by the NGOs’ criticism of what they perceived as ECOMOG’s heavy handedness in response to NPFL Operation Octopus.³⁴ NGOs also reproached ECOMOG for corruption and sexual exploitation of vulnerable Liberian women and girls. As a result, an estimated 6,000 fatherless children are left behind by departing ECOMOG troops.³⁵ NGO’s also criticized ECOMOG’s alliances with warring factions.

The relationship between ECOMOG and UNOMIL was characterized by some significant issues. First, there was a parallel command structure maintained by the two organizations.³⁶ In fact, this ECOMOG's refusal of subordination to UNOMIL has three underlying causes. First, ECOMOG's troops argued that UNOMIL was deployed after they had done the "dirty job." Second, the disparity in working conditions between the two organizations soured their relationship. UNOMIL troops were well paid while their ECOMOG counterparts suffered from poor and irregular allowances. According to Adekeye Adebajo, the UN peacekeepers received per diem allowances in excess of \$100, compared to the \$5 daily stipend of ECOMOG peacekeepers.³⁷ Third, ECOMOG did not appreciate when the UN reached out to the rebels by telling them to trust the UN, implying that ECOMOG could not be trusted. As a result, there was a lack of effective coordination and consultation between the two organizations. For the Liberian conflict, the capacity to effectively work with NGOs and the UN, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The Extra-regional Support to ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) (M)

Considering the limited resources within the OAU, the continental organization was only expected to play a political role in facilitating a solution in the Liberian conflict. For this reason, the role of the OAU was critical in the mobilization of international political, financial and material support for the initiative of ECOWAS. The OAU promoted the evolution of a regional consensus behind ECOMOG, and contributed to the Abuja Peace Accord and the process that culminated in the successful elections held

in that country during mid-1997.³⁸ The OAU played an important role in facilitating the participation of other African troops in the ECOMOG peacekeeping operation in Liberia.³⁹ This OAU intervention was critical to dilute the large Nigerian domination among ECOMOG forces. The mission later welcomed troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. However, the OAU were very passive. For the Liberian conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the OAU, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The UN (N)

Signed in July 1993, the Cotonou Accord brought the participation of the UN in the Liberian conflict. For the first time, the UN was to participate in a peacekeeping mission in Africa already initiated by another regional organization. But UN actual involvement dated back to January 1991 when the Security Council President, Ambassador Nzengeya, made a statement calling the conflicting parties to observe a cease-fire.⁴⁰ In addition, the UN Security Council Resolution 788 imposed an embargo on the importation of arms and ammunition in Liberia except for use by ECOMOG. This resolution was followed by the appointment, in November 1992, of a Special Representative to Liberia, the Jamaican Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers.⁴¹ The visits he made among the ECOWAS member states confirmed a general consensus that the United Nations should assume a larger role in the search for peace in Liberia. The UNOMIL deployed in April 1994 for an initial period of seven months. Its mandate was extended until September 1997 after the presidential elections. For the Liberian conflict, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the UN impact, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 5).

The United States (O)

Compared to the expectations, the US involvement in the Liberian conflict was limited and indirect. First, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took up almost all the American attention. Second, the end of the Cold War shifted the strategic importance of the region. The proxy wars were over. The Liberians expected the US involvement because of ties extending back to the US role in founding Liberia in the 19th century.⁴² They were hopeful when in August 1990, 6 US warships with 2,300 Marines on board anchored off the Liberian coast. But, finally these Marines concerned themselves only with evacuating Americans and other foreign nationals caught in the fight. President Bush made it clear when he declared that “Liberia is not worth the life of a single US Marine.”⁴³ However, the US played a role in the formation of the peacekeeping force, especially convincing regional states to participate. For instance, Senegal contributed 3,000 troops to ECOMOG, paid for by the US.⁴⁴ For the Liberian conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the US contribution, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 5).

European Involvement (P)

Europe was not involved, as an organization, in the Liberian conflict. As permanent members of the Security Council, the official involvement of France and Great Britain was almost limited to the vote of the different resolutions enabling the arms and ammunition embargo in Liberia and the deployment of UN peacekeepers with UNOMIL. The powerful international forces that deployed to Kuwait, Cambodia, Somalia and former Yugoslavia during the same period exhausted the rich nations' capacity and willingness to assist.⁴⁵ However, there was a trust fund set up by the UN

Secretary General to which Britain and Denmark contributed. Unofficially, it is said that France backed the Francophone states of ECOWAS to challenge the Nigerian leadership within the region prior to the deployment. For the Liberian conflict, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the European involvement, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 5).

Assessment of ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes in Liberia

Impact on Regional Security

In addition to the humanitarian arguments given by ECOWAS to justify its intervention in Liberia in 1990, there was a will to limit the effects of the Liberian war in the region. Finally, at the declared end of the war, the state of affairs, in terms of human damages, was too significant. From 1989 to 1996, while Liberian population was less than 3 millions, this bloodiest civil war claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Liberians and displaced a million others into refugee camps in neighboring countries.⁴⁶ This refugee issue was not solved at the end of the war. The close ethnic and religious ties between Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia made this refugees' issue very explosive with the risks of contagious effects. Moreover, as Taylor did not welcome his former adversaries in his administration, there was a risk of rebels breaking up within the whole region enlarging the arc of instability in the region.

Sierra Leone's conflict remained closely linked to the conflict in Liberia. Taylor was accused of backing the RUF. This has led to his current trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the charge of crimes against humanity for his role in the war in Sierra Leone. Some of Liberia's war veterans spilled into Sierra Leone, triggering a similar insurgency compelling ECOMOG to redeploy. In spite of the UN

embargo on arms and ammunition in Liberia and the seizure by the peacekeepers of large quantities of weapons during the disarmament process, ECOMOG's intervention did not produce a significantly improved regional security. ECOMOG's PKO in Liberia did not prevent the outbreak of a similar crisis in Sierra Leone, Liberia's immediate neighboring state, endangering the regional security in West Africa. Some political analysts accuse the regional peacekeeping and intervention force of complicity in the spread of regional conflict.⁴⁷ For this reason, impact on regional security, the first criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, is awarded a score of 0.5 out of 2 (see table 5).

Resolution and Prevention of Conflict Reoccurrence

Following the election of Charles Taylor as President of Liberia, ECOMOG's mission was over. Its efforts were focused on the Sierra Leonean civil war. The Liberian conflict was finished but the risks of crisis were not brushed aside. It was believed that Liberian conflict has been solved by “quick-fix” solution caused by a seven years peacekeeping fatigue. Even after elections had been held, the security situation remained precarious. These elections were more or less a façade because it was obvious that, as most Liberians believed, Taylor would continue fighting unless he could win.⁴⁸ There were reports of harassment of Krahns in Monrovia by Taylor's security forces following an incident between Taylor and his former Krahn minister of rural development, Roosevelt Johnson. As a result, 4,000 Krahns flew to Côte d'Ivoire.⁴⁹ In addition, according to Adekeye Adebajo, there were clashes over land and resources as refugees returned to areas abandoned during the civil war.⁵⁰ Security had not returned to Liberia's border as all of Taylor's main political rivals, including Alhaji Kromah, Roosevelt Johnson, and Georges Boley, lived outside the country.

Since there was no real change and the root causes remained ignored, the risk of violence erupting again remained obvious. For this reason, it is not surprising that a second Liberian civil war began in 2003 when two rebel groups, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), largely representing elements of the former ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J factions that fought Taylor during Liberia's previous civil war, emerged to impose the departure of Taylor from the Presidency. This event led to a deployment of an ECOWAS force, known as ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL), as a vanguard force before the creation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Because ECOMOG's intervention did not prevent the outbreak of a second conflict whose causes can be tracked from the first conflict, the second criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, resolution and prevention of conflict reoccurrence, is awarded a score of 0.75 out of 2 (see table 5).

Display of Results for the Liberian Case Study

A summary of the results of the analysis is as displayed in table 5.

Table 5. Summary of the Scores of Analysis for the Liberian Conflict.

Variables Operation		Inputs														
		Peacekeeping Principles				Mechanism of Deployment				Capabilities within ECOMOG				Extra Regional Support		
Liberia	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
	0	0.5	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.25	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.25
	Total: 0.5/4				Total: 1.75/4				Total: 1/4				Total: 1.5/4			

Outcomes Operation		Outcomes											
		ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes											
Liberia	Impact on Regional Security								Resolution and Prevention of Conflict reoccurrence				
	0.5/2								0.75/2				
	Total: 1.25/4												

Source: Created by author.

Case Study 2: The Guinea-Bissau conflict (1998-1999)

Guinea-Bissau was dominated by Portugal from the 1450s to its independence on 10 September 1974 after the protracted struggle by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), first under the leadership of Amílcar Cabral.⁵¹ Guinea-Bissau borders the Atlantic Ocean, between Guinea and Senegal. (see figure 4). With 1.1 million people in 1998, the country is among the world's poorest nations. The relationships between the President João Bernardo Vieira, who has ruled

Guinea-Bissau since 1980, and his Chief of Armed Forces Brigadier General Ansumane Mané, a veteran of Guinea-Bissau's anti-colonial liberation war (1963-1974), were already strained. Mané accused the President of corruption and leading the nation into poverty. But the main trigger of the conflict was the suspension of General Mané from command of the armed forces on charges of selling weapons to the Casamance rebels of southern Senegal in January 1998. President Vieira designated General Humberto Gomes as new commander of the Guinea-Bissau armed forces. Most of the military supported the suspended General, born in Gambia but devoting his adult life to the armed struggle in Bissau, especially since he played a significant role in the coup which brought Vieira to power.⁵²



Figure 4. Map of Guinea Bissau

Source: Lonely Planets, Map of Guinea Bissau, <http://www.lonelyplanet.com> (accessed 28 May 2010).

Following his sacking and attempted arrest, General Mané, along with other Army officers, staged a coup on 7 June 1998 to overthrow the government of President Vieira. This coup led to fierce fighting in Bissau, the capital.⁵³ In spite of the fact that the rebel forces had seized control of the international airport and most of the countryside, they failed to oust the government, which then received significant aid from neighboring Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Indeed, due to a stake in their own national security and because of bilateral defense agreements with Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Guinea-Conakry intervened in support of President Vieira by providing an expeditionary force. Senegal and Guinea-Conakry respectively dispatched 2,000 and 500 troops as part of *Operation Gabou*. From a Senegalese standpoint, the dismissed General was long involved in the Casamance crisis in Senegal, supplying arms to rebels to fight the Senegalese government.⁵⁴ The Senegalese contingent, the *Force Expéditionnaire Sénégalaise en Guinée Bissau (Forex)* had a dual agenda: to bolster the Vieira regime, but also to outflank the Casamance insurgent force, the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC)* operating from Guinea-Bissau.⁵⁵ ECOMOG became involved following the request of Vieira to deploy regional troops.

The Adoption of UN PKO principles

Impartiality (A)

The impartiality of an intervening force is a critical principle to be successful in a PKO. Following the ECOWAS decision to send a regional force to maintain security in Guinea-Bissau, General Mané called for the inclusion of troops from the *Communidade de Paises de Língua Portuguesa* (CPLP) comprising of Brazil, Portugal, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique, and Angola in the proposed ECOMOG force. He

feared that France and Senegal would manipulate the Francophone countries of the force.⁵⁶ He did not obtain satisfaction for this request. Usually ECOWAS affirms support of any democratically elected President when he faces a military coup. Since relational partiality is probably an inherent trait in regional insider mediators as they have asymmetrically historical ties and bonds to the conflicting parties, the rebels did not believe in the impartiality of ECOMOG.⁵⁷

However, the ECOMOG intervention could be truly considered an impartial one. Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, the two countries that were seen by the rebels as especially having direct national interests in the conflict, could not be expected to be neutral peacekeepers. Thus, they were expressly forbidden by ECOWAS from participating in the ECOMOG force. In the November 1998 Abuja Accord meeting, Vieira and Mané agreed to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Guinea-Bissau and the battle handover to a regional force.⁵⁸ All the Guinea and Senegalese soldiers were withdrawn by the end of March.⁵⁹ This situation contrasted with the environment of former ECOMOG interventions during which Nigeria was criticized for being part of the Liberian problem it tried to solve. ECOWAS cautiously avoided being seen by one side of the Guinea-Bissau conflict as an enemy. In addition, it is believed that a coalition of small states such as the one that finally deployed could ‘help allay suspicions about the motives of external interveners and reassure belligerents about the neutrality of the peacekeeping mission.’⁶⁰ For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, impartiality, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

Legitimacy (B)

The way the conflicting parties see an intervening force is often decisive in obtaining legitimacy. ECOWAS maintained its commitment to regional security as an implied task to achieve economic integration in the region. Moreover, Vieira himself, legitimate President of Guinea-Bissau, wrote to General Abdul Salam Abubacar, acting President of Nigeria and ECOWAS chairman. He requested that an ECOMOG force be sent into Guinea-Bissau to restore order.⁶¹ Neither the member states within the region, nor the UN questioned the legitimacy of ECOMOG whose purpose in Guinea-Bissau was to maintain security.

The legitimacy of ECOMOG was confirmed by the warring parties as President Vieira and General Mané accepted the decisions taken by the regional organization during the different meetings, especially the Abuja Agreements, in terms of government-sharing and elections. In addition, another consideration to be taken into account was the need for the whole region to avoid a further destabilizing flow of refugees from Guinea-Bissau into Senegal, Gambia and Guinea-Conakry which were already hosting thousands of refugees from conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The legitimacy of ECOMOG was strengthened by a need of greater assistance to stop the human suffering within the region. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, legitimacy, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 7).

Consent Agreement of the Warring Parties (C)

Both sides of the Guinea-Bissau conflict agreed with the deployment of the regional force. The military junta objected to the presence of Senegal and Guinea-Conakry in the ECOMOG force because they explicitly supported the Vieira government.

Vieira opposed the participation of any CPLP force among the peacekeepers because he suspected the organization as supporting general Mané. He was satisfied with this request. The consent of the rebels was achieved with the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops. It was the first time that a demand by a party in a major conflict with respect to force composition was heeded.⁶² Finally, an environment of suspicion was brushed aside since ECOWAS succeeded in achieving the consent agreement of both parties in spite of their further demands. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, consent of the warring parties, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 7).

Ethical Behavior of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau (D)

Peacekeeping operations, as well as peacekeepers, are expected to comply with standards of human rights and humanitarian law. There is no significant report negatively pointing fingers at the regional force which deployed in Guinea-Bissau. However, if the poor logistical support for ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau is taken into account, there is assumption that ECOMOG soldiers misbehaved in order to overcome some difficulties in terms of shortages of commodities they may have faced. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, ethical behavior, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The Mechanism of Deployment

Regional Responsiveness (E)

The Guinea-Bissau crisis began when General Mané staged an attempt coup against President Vieira on 7 June 1998. Even though there was initially some confusion

about the future of the Senegalese and Guinean force present in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS automatically responded to Vieira's request by first organizing a Foreign and Defense Ministers meeting in July 1998 in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. These ministers, on behalf of their respective Presidents, "affirmed support of the democratically elected government of President Vieira and the need to restore his authority, employing a combination of dialogue, sanctions and use of force."⁶³ This meeting was followed by two others held in Praia, Cape Verde in August 1998 and in Abuja, Nigeria in November 1998.

However, the operational and tactical responsiveness was late as the effective and complete deployment of ECOMOG force occurred only on February 1999, eight months after the attempted coup. When ECOMOG deployed, the rebels already took the cities of Bafata and Gabou, the two major towns in central and eastern Guinea-Bissau, from the Guinean troops.⁶⁴ The first need assessment proposed a 5,000-strong ECOMOG force. The 600 troops furnished by Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo were too small to produce an efficient response for the conflict. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional responsiveness, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 7).

The Regional Commitment to the Guinea-Bissau Conflict (F)

The conflict in Guinea-Bissau coincided with an ECOMOG operation still going on in Sierra Leone. This embarrassing situation affected the patronage of the Guinea-Bissau intervention. In addition, Nigeria, the then chair of the ECOWAS Authority, did not participate in the regional force's deployment in Guinea-Bissau because ECOMOG operations in West Africa had become a controversial domestic policy in Nigeria.⁶⁵ With

the death of the then Nigerian President General Sani Abacha, a day after Mané's attempted coup, and the transition to democracy with the election of Olesogun Obasanjo after 16 years of military rule, the use of the military option for regional objectives became less automatic. The Nigerian focus was elsewhere even though Abuja welcomed one of the most decisive ECOWAS meetings about the Guinea-Bissau conflict and played a significant role in the military preparation for ECOMOG deployment.⁶⁶

The ECOWAS member states' commitment was questioned because their troop contribution was very limited compared to the military forces available in each of these member states (see table 6). In addition, the Guinea-Bissau conflict accentuated the gap between Anglophone and Francophone member states in terms of commitment to intra-state conflicts. Even though Guinea-Bissau is a Portuguese-speaking state, the Anglophone member states seemed to pay back the Francophone states their lack of support during the Liberian crisis. Beside Gambia, which had an indirect national interest on a peaceful resolution of the conflict, no Anglophone member state contributed troops to ECOMOG in the Guinea-Bissau conflict. The effectiveness of ECOWAS in the area of conflict management continued to be undermined by this fundamental disunity.⁶⁷ The second criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional commitment, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

Table 6. Military Forces and Expenditure in West Africa, 1999-2000.

No	States	Total Armed Forces	GDP (in US \$ millions)
1	Benin	4,750	2,400
2	Burkina Faso	10,000	3,500
3	Cape Verde	1,200	257
4	Côte d'Ivoire	13,900	13,100
5	Gambia	800	446
6	Ghana	7,000	10,100
7	Guinea	9,700	3,600
8	Guinea Bissau	9,250	303
9	Liberia	15,000	450
10	Mali	7,350	2,900
11	Niger	5,300	1,700
12	Nigeria	78,500	50,000
13	Senegal	10,000	5,200
14	Sierra Leone	6,000	724
15	Togo	9,450	1,500
TOTAL		188,200	96,180

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000/2001* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

The Clarity and the Feasibility of ECOMOG's Mandate (G)

At the beginning, the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau would be under the overall command of the Nigerian Major General Timothy Shelpedi who, at that time, was ECOMOG commander in the neighboring Sierra Leone. Finally, the Guinea-Bissau operation was separated from the Sierra Leonean theater. This final decision made much more sense since, assigning both Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone to one commander would mean that the mandates were similar. After the withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops, as called for by the Abuja Accord in November 1998, an ECOMOG force of 600 troops from Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo deployed with the mandate of

“monitoring the cease-fire and thereby facilitating the holding of elections.”⁶⁸ This mandate could be handled by ECOMOG if its size was much larger. No exit date was given. Instead, the only condition of withdrawal was the holding of presidential and legislative elections. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the clarity of the mandate, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The Regional Understanding of the Conflict (H)

It is worthy to question the understanding of the Guinea-Bissau conflict by ECOWAS. The number of troops was grossly insufficient compared to the mandate tasked: monitor the cease-fire and thereby facilitate the holding of elections. Senegal and Guinea-Conakry deployed 2,400 troops in Guinea-Bissau and controlled only the capital, Bissau, with a significant number of WIA and KIA. ECOWAS should understand that its 600 troops were ridiculously small to be able to achieve the objective of monitoring a cease-fire. ECOWAS did not appear to seriously consider the fact that insurgencies in Africa are typically overwhelmingly manned and well-equipped with clear political objectives. As a result, the 4-months of ECOMOG presence was futile as General Mané, aware of the limited capabilities of such a small force, resorted to military means to achieve his political objectives.

In addition, the presidential and legislative elections to be held in March 1999, as called for by the Abuja peace accord was about to be held. ECOWAS needed to first understand the root causes of the conflict, then secure the whole country before scheduling elections which, at the point in time were materially and organizationally impossible. As a limited capabilities organization, ECOWAS could only support the

initiatives developed by the CPLP which facilitated the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between conflicting parties on the Portuguese frigate the *Corte Real* on 26 July 1998. Instead, ECOWAS, seeing the CPLP initiative as an attempt by an outside body to interfere in its background, challenged the decisions taken. It was a loss of time since the decisions adopted during the joint ECOWAS-CPLP meeting in Praia, Cape Verde, looked similar to those previously taken by the CPLP when it met on *Corte Real*.

However, it is worthy to consider the fact that the different positions of the belligerents were not easily reconcilable as testified by the succession of broken peace agreements. The rebels had achieved significant political and military strength within the country while the legitimacy of a democratically elected President could also not be questioned. Thus, a robust strategy was necessary in order to force compliance from warring parties. An assembled ECOWAS summit meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, finally pressured them on the 1st of November 1998 into signing a peace agreement.⁶⁹ But a well-equipped and large number of troops were required to restore peace in such an intra-state conflict in order to compel the belligerents to respect the decision taken in Abuja. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, this fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional understanding of the conflict, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The Capabilities within the Deployed Force

ECOMOG Logistical Aptitude (I)

The limited logistical capabilities of the region did not allow ECOMOG to deploy earlier. ECOMOG deployed when Togo dispatched an advanced detachment of some 110

military personnel in December 1998 followed by the bulk of ECOMOG force in February 1999.⁷⁰ ECOWAS was unable to field even the small ECOMOG force on its own. The main purpose of the ECOWAS ministerial delegation, which visited the UN headquarters and met with the then Secretary General Kofi Annan in December 1998, was to appeal for financial and technical assistance to accomplish its tasks in Guinea-Bissau.⁷¹ Unfortunately with the continuing instability, the assistance that was to come from donors did not arrive. France transported ECOMOG troops into Guinea-Bissau aboard the *Sirrocco*, supplied a number of military trucks, and provided participating countries with *per diem* for their peacekeepers.⁷² The size of the regional force that ultimately deployed in Guinea-Bissau reflected the limited logistical capabilities of the 4 troops-contributing countries: Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo.

Despite significant French assistance, logistic and communications problems hampered the effectiveness of the force which remained weak and underfunded. The withdrawal of Senegalese and Guinean troops was completed, after an extension of the deadline from 28 February to 16 March, due to ECOMOG logistical problems prior to its deployment.⁷³ The force was unable to move into the northern part of Guinea-Bissau in order to occupy a buffer zone along the border with Senegal due to a lack of trucks and follow-on logistics. As a result, General Mané took advantage of the ill-equipped ECOMOG force to oust Vieira on 7 May 1999. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, logistical aptitude, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 7).

Command and Control in the Guinea-Bissau Conflict (J)

There was a significant confusion about the command and control for the Guinea-Bissau conflict. The Nigerian Major General Timothy Shelpedi, ECOMOG Commander in Sierra Leone, was tasked to prepare the deployment of ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau. The regional ministers recommended that ECOMOG's functions and mandates be broadened beyond Sierra Leone to include Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁴ But, finally, the regional force was led by Task Force (TF) Commander Colonel Gnakoude Berema of Togo. In this kind of conflict including senior military and civilian leaders, it would be better to appoint a General officer. On the ground, ECOMOG's force commander oversaw military operations. As in Liberia, the force commander did not have complete control of the various contingents, whose leaders also answered much more to their respective military chiefs in their home countries.⁷⁵

There was no Special Representative of ECOWAS on the ground such as during all UN missions. This Special Representative would be assigned high-level diplomatic tasks on the ground. This appointment would enable a much better flow of information and command and control from the strategic to the operational body. The lack of ECOWAS diplomatic presence on the ground created a burden for the Force Commander because he had to handle both diplomatic tasks and purely military issues. However, even though ECOMOG stayed only 4 months in Guinea-Bissau, the positive point is that there was only one Force Commander during the presence of ECOMOG ensuring a continuity of command. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, command and control, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

ECOMOG Tactical and Operational Gain on the Ground (K)

The efficiency of the ECOMOG force in Guinea-Bissau was really hampered because of logistical shortfalls and the small force size. The ECOMOG force was slow to deploy and proved ineffective in fulfilling an over-ambitious mandate. During its deployment, ECOMOG did not succeed in ousting the rebels in key positions. The rebels' tactical achievements remained intact. The rebels had military control of important points around the capital, including the international airport, as well as large parts of the countryside.⁷⁶ The lack of sufficient trucks and communication assets prevented the force from venturing in the countryside.

Despite the presence of the ECOMOG force, General Mané chose to exercise his overwhelming military superiority. When the junta ousted Vieira on 7 May 1999, ECOMOG's soldiers were in no position to prevent the renewed fighting and remained in their barracks.⁷⁷ The key positive point is that ECOMOG successfully reopened the country's international airport even though the Abuja accord explicitly called the rebels to abandon it. Some ECOMOG members also chaired a special disarmament commission which included representatives of both parties and reported some success in recovering significant quantities of weapons.⁷⁸ For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, tactical and operational gain on the ground, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 7).

ECOMOG Abilities to Work with NGOs and the UN (L)

ECOMOG deployment in Guinea-Bissau was too short to significantly impact on the work of the NGOs. There is no known report blaming ECOMOG for not cooperating with the different NGOs active in Guinea-Bissau. When ECOMOG deployed in the

capital, Bissau, their relationships with the NGOs were normal. ECOMOG helped improve the security of those engaged for the population's humanitarian relief. Since the deployed force was very limited in terms of mobility due to its logistical shortfalls, ECOMOG was only able to protect the NGOs in the vicinity of Bissau. In the country side, the NGOs only relied on the kindness of the rebels to let them do their job without any risk, danger or disturbance.

The relationship between ECOMOG and the UN during the Guinea-Bissau conflict was good. The subordination of ECOWAS was much more evident than during the Liberian conflict. ECOMOG succeeded in establishing a viable relationship with the UN while searching for peace between the warring parties in Guinea Bissau. Shortly after the signing of the Abuja Agreement, foreign ministers of ECOWAS went to New York to brief the UN Security Council on the ECOMOG mission. During the crisis, ECOWAS continuously submitted periodic reports to the UN Security Council concerning its activities in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁹ It was a significant improvement knowing that, for instance in Liberia, ECOMOG was only nominally accountable to ECOWAS, which globally exercised little oversight and provided minimal political guidance. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the capacity to effectively work with NGOs and the UN, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The Extra-regional Support to ECOMOG Intervention in Guinea-Bissau
The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) (M)

The OAU played a marginal role during the Guinea-Bissau conflict. At the time of the attempted coup, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU was

in session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The organization immediately issued a statement denouncing the attempted coup of June 1998 and urging respect of the country's democratically established institutions and called on the people of Guinea-Bissau to rally behind the government of President Vieira.⁸⁰ The OAU designated Alexandre Zandemela as its Special Envoy. The OAU position during the conflict emphasized the leading role of ECOWAS as a regional organization, whilst, once more highlighting the intrinsic ineffectiveness of the continental body in terms of conflict management.⁸¹

For the Guinea-Bissau crisis, the OAU should have shared the burden of conflict management with ECOWAS already overstretched by the Liberian and Sierra Leonean conflicts. The timidity of the continental organization was a subject of concern for the Africans. With the view of overcoming its shortfalls in terms of conflict management, the African Union was established in 2002 with more emphasis on conflict management. However, even though the OAU did not provide any materiel support, it played significant role in the political ground. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the OAU, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The UN (N)

In terms of conflict resolution efforts, the UN Security Council condemned the coup in Guinea-Bissau and strongly opposed the use of force for non-conventional purposes. The UN also was very supportive to the diplomatic option first initiated by ECOWAS. It commended the efforts made by ECOWAS to restore peace in Guinea-Bissau. At the early stage of the conflict, Resolution 1216, adopted unanimously, asked

the UN Secretary General to make recommendations on a possible UN role in peace process in Guinea-Bissau. Later, the Security Council called for an urgent establishment of a government of national unity (GNU) in Guinea-Bissau and the holding of general and presidential elections there no later than the end of March 1999.⁸²

The UN also welcomed ECOMOG's role in the implementation of the Abuja Agreement, aimed at guaranteeing security along the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal border, keeping apart the parties in conflict and guaranteeing free access to humanitarian efforts. It subsequently set up the United Nations Peace Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS).⁸³ The UN Secretary General appointed Samuel C. Nana-Sinkam, from Cameroon, as his Special Representative and Head of UNOGBIS. The UN did not provide any significant materiel support. It focused its efforts on the political aspect of the conflict. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the UN impact, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 7).

The United States (O)

The US did not play a well known role in the Guinea-Bissau beside its input as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This limited involvement of the US is not surprising knowing the little American national interest in Guinea-Bissau. However, the US encouraged West African states to be more engaged in the region on a political and military peacekeeping level. The US helped strengthen the capabilities of Benin to provide international humanitarian relief because the Beninese contingent which deployed in Guinea-Bissau had been trained under the US ACRI program.⁸⁴ For the

Guinea-Bissau conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra-regional support, the US contribution, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 7).

European Involvement (P)

The conflict management of Guinea-Bissau was characterized by a diplomatic rivalry between Portugal, former Guinea-Bissau colonial power and France, the dominant extra-regional power in the region. Their respective interest in the country was highlighted when, during the significant clashes between rebels and governmental coalition, the entire diplomatic corps was evacuated by sea except their respective ambassadors. The French and Portuguese ambassadors transported the rebels' representatives in Bissau in a French helicopter before reaching Banjul for pre-negotiations prior to the Abuja meeting.⁸⁵ France also financed and transported the predominantly francophone ECOMOG force to Bissau. Portugal sent a warship to Guinea-Bissau waters during the conflict.

While France wanted to prop up the Vieira regime, Portugal was perceived as being close to Mané. The underlying causes of the French engagement in Guinea-Bissau can be tracked to the increased French influence after Vieira joined the CFA franc currency zone in 1997. The role of Portugal was also diluted into the different CPLP peace initiatives. Portugal, as a 2-year non-permanent member, played a role in achieving funds promised by donors. For the Guinea-Bissau conflict, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the European involvement, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 7).

Assessment of ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes in Guinea-Bissau

Impact on Regional Security

Most of the West Africans criticized ECOMOG for its failure to fulfill its mission in Guinea-Bissau. ECOMOG was not able to deploy in the Senegal-Guinea-Bissau border in order to prevent rebels' incursion into the southern part of Senegal. Because the regional force also did not stay longer in Guinea-Bissau, especially Bissau, General Mané succeeded in overthrowing the legitimate President Vieira. These ECOMOG shortfalls as a peacekeeping force predestined a chaotic regional security outcome. From a Senegalese prospective, Mané success after Senegalese troops' withdrawal was very frustrating because, even though rebels' logistical capabilities were seriously affected, ECOMOG failure denied the area any short-term possibility to enjoy stability.

In spite of the diplomatic and military efforts done by ECOWAS, the Guinea-Bissau conflict significantly affected the whole region. It generated a large flow of refugees due to the ethnic links among Senegalese, Guinea-Bissau, and Gambian populations. In the following days of the fighting between Vieira's forces and the rebels, more than 3,000 foreign nationals were evacuated from the capital by ship to Senegal. An estimated further 200,000 residents of Bissau fled the city prompting fears of a humanitarian disaster, with the hostilities preventing aid organizations from distributing emergency food and medical supplies to the refugees.⁸⁶ Some 170,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) were located in the Guinea-Bissau capital. For those previous reasons, impact on regional security, the first criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, is awarded a score of 0.75 out of 2 (see table 7).

Resolution and Prevention of Conflict Reoccurrence

After the overthrowing of president Vieira, there was political and military tension between the new Bissau government and neighboring Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. Since Senegal and Guinea-Conakry openly supported Vieira regime, they were legitimately seen by the new government and General Mané as enemies. This situation was a possible trigger of further violence in the western part of the region. The military coup, which first brought General Mané to power before the first democratically elected leader in Bissau history in February 2000, was only a short success since the seeds of instability were around. Finally, because ECOMOG's intervention did not help solve the 1998-1999 conflict, whose consequences led once again to the recent political instability which cost both Vieira and General Batista Tagme Na Waie their lives, the second criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, resolution and prevention of conflict reoccurrence, is awarded a score of 1 out of 2 (see table 7).

Display of Results for the Guinea-Bissau Case Study

A summary of the results of the analysis is as displayed in table 7.

Table 7. Summary of the Scores of Analysis for the Guinea-Bissau Conflict.

Variables Operation		Inputs														
		Peacekeeping Principles				Mechanism of Deployment				Capabilities within ECOMOG				Extra Regional Support		
Guinea- Bissau	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
	0.5	0.75	0.75	0.5	0.25	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.25	0.75
	Total: 2.5/4				Total: 1.75/4				Total: 1/4				Total: 2/4			

Outcomes Operation		Outcomes														
		ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes														
Guinea- Bissau	Impact on Regional Security							Resolution and Prevention of Conflict reoccurrence								
	0.75/2							1/2								
	Total: 1.75/4															

Source: Created by author.

Case Study 3: The Ivorian conflict (2002-20..)

From its independence on 7 August 1960 to the 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire was considered as a model of political stability avoiding many of the local problems such as military coups and civil war that plagued most of the African states. As a result, under the strong leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire developed its economy, attracted significant foreign investments and became the world largest producer of cocoa. President Houphouet-Boigny welcomed immigrants from neighboring countries to work

in Côte d'Ivoire from which the economy drew much of its strength. The country also maintained a close political allegiance to the West, especially France, its former colonial ruler.⁸⁷ However, the myth, charisma, and political and economic competence of Houphouet-Boigny masked significant issues. After his death in 1993 which generated a profound crisis of leadership, it became apparent that the Ivorian stability had had shallow and dangerous roots.⁸⁸ Ethnic tensions came out targeting the large number of foreigners who had been Ivorian citizens for generations. Many of these alleged foreigners, especially from Mali and Burkina Faso, the neighboring country in the north, migrated to Côte d'Ivoire as it was the economic hub of West Africa (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Map of Côte d'Ivoire

Source: U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Cote D'Ivoire, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm> (accessed 27 May 2010).

In 1993, Houphouet-Boigny's constitutional successor, National Assembly President and Chairman of the *Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI), Henri Konan Bédié, became Head of State. During his administration, he faced many difficulties including economic pressure, internal corruption and growing political opposition. The power struggle saw him influencing the National Assembly to pass a controversial electoral code stipulating that presidential candidates for the 1995 presidential elections must be born of Ivorian parents.⁸⁹ A Muslim very popular in the north of the country, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who served as Prime Minister under Houphouet-Boigny, was targeted by the term *Ivoirity*.

This *Ivoirity* created a cleavage between the Muslim north and the Christian and animist south. On 25 December 1999, through the first military coup ever experienced in Côte d'Ivoire, General Robert Guei ousted Bédié, who fled to France, formed a new government and promised to hold open elections in late 2000.⁹⁰ Tension increased when the Supreme Court prevented Ouattara again from running for the 2000 presidential elections. Finally, during the 2000 presidential elections, when early polling results showed Laurent Gbagbo of the *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI) in the lead, General Guei stopped the process, claiming fraud and declared himself the winner. Gbagbo supporters and many soldiers took the streets of Abidjan and after a bloody confrontation with Guei's partisans, forced the General to flee.

Supporters of the *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) of Alassane Ouattara then took the streets, calling for new elections because their presidential candidate was unfairly declared ineligible. More violence erupted and finally Ouattara called for peace and recognized the Gbagbo presidency.⁹¹ In the aftermath of a 7 January 2001 attempted

coup, President Gbagbo formed a *de facto* Government of National Unity (GNU) that included the RDR. But on 19 September 2002, a group of soldiers, among others, executed a well coordinated attack on three major cities (Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo) to overthrow state institutions. Having failed to take control of Abidjan city on the first day, they retracted and established their stronghold in Bouaké. The Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), under the leadership of Guillaume Soro, a former student leader, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) claimed the rebellion and came together under the pseudonym of *Forces Nouvelles* (FN).⁹² The rebels' motivation for their activities rested in their desire to remove President Gbagbo from office and also to avenge the killing of the country's former military ruler, General Robert Guei, who died in the first day of fighting in September 2002. The conflict was splitting the country along ethnic and religious lines.⁹³ Assessing the gravity of the situation, ECOWAS decided to intervene.

The Adoption of UN PKO principles

Impartiality (A)

The principle of impartiality was very critical in the complex Ivorian conflict. In contrast with France, which was accused by the FPI and its supporters, the “Young Patriots” of siding with the rebellion, ECOWAS’ regional force was not criticized for taking side. Even though the very idea of an ECOWAS force at the beginning of the crisis shocked Ivorians, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) was seen by both Abidjan and Bouaké as a neutral PKO force. However, some ECOWAS member states’ impartiality was challenged by President Gbagbo and the FPI. Apart from Burkina Faso, whose direct participation was clearly ruled out, the FPI has also accused Mali and

Liberia of backing the rebellion.⁹⁴ Finally, none of the countries considered as impartial by the Ivorian government contributed to the regional force that deployed in Côte d'Ivoire. For instance, Mali did not participate in ECOMICI force, probably because it was considered that national sentiments towards the large number of Malian immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire would compromise its neutrality. This situation prevented ECOMICI from being permanently seen as siding with the rebels. For the Ivorian conflict, impartiality, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 1 out of 1 (see table 8).

Legitimacy (B)

From an official Ivorian standpoint, the legitimacy of ECOMICI may be questioned if we looked back at the Ivorian opposition to the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia in 1990. Côte d'Ivoire, among most Francophone countries, challenged the legitimacy of the regional intervention that landed in Liberia. However, Côte d'Ivoire finally accepted the principle of the intervention as it committed itself in the Liberian war as a third party. ECOWAS legitimized its action in terms of its duty to set the condition necessary for economic growth. For this to occur, an environment for peace was necessary. From an economical standpoint, one should not forget the extreme geo-strategic importance of Côte d'Ivoire. It is the economic engine of Francophone West Africa and an immigration magnet for less developed hinterland countries. Its descent into chaos would thus have had a serious impact on the whole West African region and perhaps even beyond.⁹⁵

The protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security of December 1999 constitutes the most

comprehensive normative framework for confronting threats to peace and security in the region to resolve conflicts when they occur. The Mechanism established inextricable links between the primordial *raison d'être* of ECOWAS, the economic and social development of the people, and the security of the peoples within West Africa. This mechanism also tasked ECOWAS member states with the responsibility to manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts as well as manage humanitarian, natural and environmental crises.⁹⁶ ECOMICI also found its legitimacy in the fact that both sides of the Ivorian conflict agreed with the presence of a third party. ECOWAS achieved the legitimacy of ECOMICI by reaching out the rebels in Bouaké and the legal government in Abidjan. For the Ivorian conflict, legitimacy, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

Consent Agreement of the Warring Parties (C)

ECOWAS worked hard to achieve the consent agreement of the belligerents of the Ivorian crisis. The deployment of ECOMICI occurred after significant talks and maneuvers between ECOWAS and the belligerents. Chiefs of Staff of ECOWAS member states met in Abidjan to prepare the deployment of the regional force. They were also in Bouaké area to meet the rebels in this regard.⁹⁷ In spite of questions about the real objectives of a regional force in Côte d'Ivoire, the deployment of ECOMICI was accepted. From the rebels' standpoint, at the beginning of the conflict, a regional force was much more acceptable and trustful than the French force which is considered as siding with the Ivorian government because of Defense Accords. For the Ivorian conflict, consent of the warring parties, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 8).

Ethical Behavior of ECOMOG in Côte d'Ivoire (D)

From a peacekeeping standpoint, ethical behavior is acting in ways that are consistent with the commonly held values of a PKO. In contrast with past ECOMOG interventions within the region, there is no significant report about shortfalls in term of ethical behavior. This non-existence of ethical shortfalls within the force assumes that ECOMICI did well. One explanation may be the fact that peacekeeping units are heavily influenced by their field commander, and their home country culture. The 5 contributing countries that finally deployed in Côte d'Ivoire did not have any local record in terms of human right abuses. For the Ivorian conflict, ethical behavior, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the peacekeeping principles, is awarded 1 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Mechanism of Deployment

Regional Responsiveness (E)

ECOWAS responded very quickly at the diplomatic level. After the outbreak of the crisis, political statements coming from Heads of States within the region condemned resorting of weapons for political purposes. Assumedly, there was great anxiety and fear about a probable regionalization of the crisis. There was talk of a mutiny, coup or even terrorism as everything was conducted in a blur characterized by a lack of information.⁹⁸ In spite of this confusion, on 29 September 2002, ten days after the rebellion, an extraordinary summit, including all the ECOWAS member states' presidents, was held in Accra, Ghana in order to adopt a common strategy. They decided to set up a "contact group" composed of Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. In order to avoid a duplication of effort, ECOWAS designated President Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo as its principal coordinator to facilitate the day to day management of the mediation effort.

Following the Accra meeting, a delegation composed of foreign ministers of countries of the “contact group,” and conducted by Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, went to Abidjan. Finally, a cease-fire agreement between the Ivorian government and the rebels was achieved and an environment of dialogue established.

In addition, ECOWAS’ Executive Secretary appointed Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, of Nigeria, as his Special Representative. There was total consensus by all ECOWAS heads of state to deploy an intervention force in RCI. Senegal which had the presidency of ECOWAS at that time, hosted a second summit on Côte d'Ivoire in Dakar. During this 18 December 2002 summit, the ECOWAS Heads of States furthermore finalized their decision to send a regional contingent mission to ensure compliance with the agreements’ cease-fire. A meeting of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) was organized on 6 November 2002 to discuss the deficiencies of equipment, logistics support and funding.⁹⁹ Chiefs of Staff of ECOWAS member states met in Abidjan to prepare the deployment of the regional force. However, originally scheduled for late November 2002, according to the summit held in Accra, Ghana on 29 September 2002, the establishment of the peacekeeping force was very slow. When the civil war began in September 2002, over 10,000 people were killed within a few months.¹⁰⁰ On 18 January 2003, only the Senegalese contingent with 172 soldiers had arrived in Abidjan. The rest of the ECOWAS troops landed on March 6 with 1100 additional troops from Benin, Ghana, Niger, and Togo.¹⁰¹ For the Ivorian conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional responsiveness, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Regional Commitment to the Ivorian Conflict (F)

Among all the intra-states conflicts ECOWAS dealt with, the Ivorian crisis was the most fearful. From a regional standpoint, the predominant economic role of Côte d'Ivoire in the region predestined a negative impact on all other countries in the region. The high level of labor mobility had made Côte d'Ivoire an economic power in West Africa and its ports (Abidjan and San Pedro) were the gateways to most of the international trade within the region.¹⁰² Refugees' flows, the future of the CFA franc currency, intense weapons traffic, multiple interactions between Côte d'Ivoire and unstable Liberia put at risks the stability of the whole region.¹⁰³ As a result, the political leadership within the region was very active in their attempts to find a quick solution to the Ivorian crisis. This commitment was significantly shared among ECOWAS member states as the peace efforts were decentralized and cautiously avoided duplication of efforts. For instance, in order to reconcile the leadership of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso that accused each other of being responsible of the Ivorian crisis, President Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali hosted a meeting with President Gbagbo and President Blaise Compaoré. They both vowed to work closely for peace in Côte d'Ivoire.¹⁰⁴

This commitment was fairly marginal since only 5 out of 15 member states agreed to contribute to ECOMICI troops. However, ECOWAS deserves credit for assuming its responsibilities in close cooperation with the UN. Well aware of its harmful effects on both the economies and the security of the region, ECOWAS showed leadership and dedication in trying to manage the Côte d'Ivoire crisis. When difficulties emerged from the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreements, ECOWAS once again took the lead with a series of summits aimed at preventing the re-ignition of violence and

facilitating the smooth implementation of this agreement. This led to the signing of the Accra Peace Accords complementing the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreements.¹⁰⁵ For the Ivorian conflict, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional commitment, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Clarity and the Feasibility of ECOMOG's Mandate (G)

ECOWAS approved a mandate for its peacekeeping force. It gave ECOMICI the mandate “to monitor the cessation of hostilities, facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services, contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement, and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff.”¹⁰⁶ The lessons learned from past interventions in Liberia enabled ECOWAS to become more aware of the necessity to give a clear and doable mandate. This may explain the length of the mandate during the Ivorian crisis. But the issue of building a regional peacekeeping force which did not necessarily match with the broadness of its mandate continued to put the regional PKO’s leadership in an embarrassing situation. It is quite clear that ECOMICI’s mandate required building a larger force. The actual ECOMICI size was too small to execute the agreed mandate. To fulfill its mandate, ECOMICI needed to be deployed almost everywhere within the Ivorian territory. For the Ivorian conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the clarity of the mandate, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Regional Understanding of the Conflict (H)

The Ivorian conflict is the result of a series of crisis that broke out following the death of Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993. The conflict was a complex power struggle, mixing issues of nationalism, militarism and ownership, religious affiliation and its impact on political behavior, and the nature of independence from the former colonial power, France.¹⁰⁷ ECOWAS had the required self-understanding enabling it to stand as an unavoidable third party in the Ivorian conflict. Even though the principles remained that one should not change a government through violence within the region, ECOWAS was aware of the fact that it should make the principles practical with some realism also. The military achievement of the Ivorian rebellion made the *Forces Nouvelles* a real force to deal with. ECOWAS cautiously tried to accommodate the two parties in order to primarily achieve a cease-fire. ECOWAS diplomatic tasks led the group of contact both in Abidjan and in Bouaké, the rebels' stronghold.

ECOWAS also understood that France, which maintained strong ties with its former colony, had a role to play in order bring the Ivorians together. The regional organization met in Paris, France on 25 January 2003.¹⁰⁸ However, ECOWAS did not thoroughly address the conflict's regional aspect as most of the Ivorians believed that, among others, Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had conflicting relationships with Laurent Gbagbo, was directly implicated in the creation of two rebel groups in the west of the country allegedly composed of a significant number of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans. For the Ivorian conflict, this fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the mechanism of deployment, the regional understanding of the conflict, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Capabilities within the Deployed Force

ECOMOG Logistical Aptitude (I)

The regional force was very slow to deploy in Côte d'Ivoire. Its deployment initially scheduled for late November 2002, was complete only on March 2003. This late deployment was caused by traditional logistical weaknesses the region was experiencing since its first intervention in Liberia. Having been mandated to control the ceasefire line until the ECOWAS force could be deployed, the French were essentially alone for five months. The first 172 troops arrived only on 18 January 2003, followed by 1,100 on 6 March.¹⁰⁹ ECOWAS found it difficult to fund such a small force. On several occasions, top military leaders within the regional force complained of the logistical weaknesses which hampered the tactical deployment of the force on the ground. In addition, the limited resources in terms of personnel showed a regional incapacity to sustain a larger force without Nigeria's participation. ECOMICI troop levels had never been increased in spite of the promises given by regional leadership to achieve 3,500 "White Helmets." ECOWAS recognized its funds shortage and the risks of hampering the operations of the military unit as the Council appealed to international donors, including the UN, the EU, the US, Canada and Japan, to help finance ECOMICI.¹¹⁰ France, which had critical national interests in Côte d'Ivoire, played a significant role in sustaining ECOMICI.

Moreover, in spite of the small size of the regional force furnished by Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, there was no integrated logistics plan. One can imagine the incoherence of a logistic system in which the French RECAMP program provided support to certain countries while Great Britain and Belgium provided support respectively to Ghana and Benin. The lack of integrated logistic support resulted in a

laborious build up of the force, which had to be stopped on several occasions to get the communications equipment operational and to wait the arrival of more radios from France.¹¹¹ There was also a great deal of financial uncertainty. The Force Commander did not have any control over the future of his finances. Indeed he sometimes had to operate for up to two months without any funds.¹¹² For the Ivorian conflict, logistical aptitude, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0 out of 1 (see table 8).

Command and Control in the Ivorian Conflict (J)

The main positive point about Command and Control during the Ivorian conflict is that a Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (SRES), Ambassador Ralph Uwechue, was appointed at the very early stage of the conflict. Former ECOMOG interventions showed that a shortfall in terms of the lack of an integrated chain of command structure was a key concern to the accomplishment of the overall peace process. In Côte d'Ivoire, the task of the SRES was to direct PKOs of the force. Another positive point is that the Force Commander remained in post for a relative long period to enable a continuity of effort.

However, the Force Commander was not nominated in a timely fashion in order to enable coherent mission planning and management capacity. Brigadier General Papa Khalilou Fall was nominated and confirmed only on 18 December 2002. If the Force Commander is accountable to the Executive Secretary through the Special Representative, the SRES should not be deployed before the Force Commander. In addition, the staff of the SRES in Côte d'Ivoire has clearly been inadequate and under-resourced.¹¹³ According to the report on lessons learnt from ECOWAS PKOs from 1990

to 2004, there was only one military officer assisting the SRES. The office of the SRES is too important to be left short of resources. It should be adequately staffed and empowered. For the Ivorian conflict, command and control, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 8).

ECOMOG Tactical and Operational Gain on the Ground (K)

Even though ECOMICI deployment was too slow, the regional force was successful in policing the cease-fire. It was a credible force which achieved major successes in the peace process and helped prevent Côte d'Ivoire from sliding back into conflict. Most importantly, the impartial ECOMICI force maintained permanent liaison with belligerents on both sides.¹¹⁴ The regional force utilized its critical aptitude for dialogue and communication to set the conditions necessary to build trust between ECOMICI and the belligerents and to avoid escalation of tensions. From a purely military standpoint, ECOMICI troops also successfully participated in the operation aiming to secure and protect the east-west ceasefire line dividing the country, known as the Zone of Confidence (ZOC). In this operation they showed their flexibility and capability to work very well with the French forces. The regional peacekeepers played a significant role within UNOCI as they were very familiar with the area because of a year of experience on the ground before being absorbed by UNOCI. However, the small size of the force prevented it from making more robust efforts to protect civilians still under the threat of violence in Côte d'Ivoire, especially in the the west of the country. For the Ivorian conflict, tactical and operational gain on the ground, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0.5 out of 1 (see table 8).

ECOMOG Ability to Work with NGOs and the UN (L)

As stated in its mandate which tasked it, among other things, to guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers and humanitarian staff, ECOMICI played a significant role in helping the NGOs in fulfilling their missions. When ECOMICI deployed in April 2003, the humanitarian situation was already deteriorating. At the end of July 2003, humanitarian workers placed the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 700,000 and 1,000,000 and there had been major violence in the west against civilians by all sides, and humanitarian access was difficult.¹¹⁵ The intervening forces including ECOMICI, provided escorts and close protection to the NGOs. Moreover there is not a report blaming a lack of support and cooperation from the West African regional force. MINUCI, which was established by the UN Security Council to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement, worked closely with ECOMICI on elaborating a disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion/reintegration (DDR) program for former fighters. ECOMICI and MINUCI worked cooperatively well until they were absorbed by ONUCI. For the Ivorian conflict, the capacity to effectively work with NGOs and the UN, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the capabilities within ECOMOG, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The Extra-regional Support to ECOMOG Intervention in Côte d'Ivoire

The Organization of Africa Unity (OAU) (M)

It is worthy to remember that when the Ivorian crisis occurred, the OAU was transformed into the AU. The AU was founded on the principle of more interventionism. This new principle transferred a degree of sovereign authority to the AU as the ultimate guarantor of the rights and well-being of Africans.¹¹⁶ For this reason, the AU

commitment to work on possible solutions to end the Ivorian crisis was significant. The AU had condemned the attempted military coup as an unacceptable means for those wanting to achieve their goals. Even though the conflict situation that emerged in Côte d'Ivoire was largely managed and addressed through the efforts of ECOWAS, the AU had a supporting role to play as it viewed the situation with grave concern. Through its support for ECOWAS, the AU as a continental organization gave legitimacy to ECOMICI. Later, the AU became increasingly involved especially in political reform in Côte d'Ivoire. It appointed the then South African President and Chairman of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, as a mediator. Mbeki himself was very active and played a significant role for the selection of a neutral Prime Minister. The Involvement of the AU was accentuated by the fact that an Ivorian, the diplomat Amara Essy, was at that time the Secretary General of the continental organization. For the Ivorian conflict, the first criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the OAU, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The UN (N)

The United Nations was the last to intervene even though it immediately issued a statement denouncing the attacks. It also called the belligerents to respect the rule of law, democracy and human rights. The UN Secretary General appointed Albert Tévoedjré of Benin as his Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire to head a Monitoring Committee mandated to supervise application of the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. The UN played a role in the implementation of these Accords which created a transitional government that included political parties and insurgents and had wide-ranging executive powers to lead the country to elections in 2005.¹¹⁷ This Monitoring Committee was composed of ten

members. It had representatives from the AU, the International Organization of Francophone countries (IOF), the G8, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the EU, ECOWAS, Operation Licorne and ECOMICI.¹¹⁸ In order to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreements, the UN also established the United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) through Security Council Resolution 1479 of 13 May 2003. MINUCI, consisting of a 75 member military liaison group and small civilian staff, was tasked with monitoring the military situation, building trust between Ivorian government and the *Forces Nouvelles*, and providing input on disengagement, disarmament, and demobilization.¹¹⁹ MINUCI, which assisted the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to fulfill his tasks, was an important sign of international commitment.

As little progress had been made in implementing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, the UN decided to act under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, established the UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months starting from 4 April 2004. The UNOCI absorbed ECOMICI and MINUCI forces and reached more than 5,000 troops, while the Licorne operation co-operated with it. The Senegalese General, Abdoulaye Fall, ECOMICI Force Commander, took over UNOCI. This UN force deployed throughout the Ivorian territory and worked alongside French forces. The UN was very effective and responsive to the developments in the Ivorian crisis. In February 2006, the UN Security Council imposed individual sanctions against governmental leaders that it identified as posing serious obstacle to the peacekeeping force and sabotaging the peace process.

UNSCR 1572 established an arms embargo for both sides following government forces' violation of the ceasefire in late 2004 when rebel positions in the north were attacked. For the Ivorian conflict, the second criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the UN impact, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

The United States (O)

The US was not the leader in the search for solutions in Côte d'Ivoire. It remained largely uninvolved in the peace process. When the Ivorian conflict occurred in September 2002, the American attention was focused on overthrowing Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. However, the US was an active partner with Western European countries and international organizations. The different UN Security Council Resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire could not be adopted without the full backing of the US. The US Department of State (DOS) warned parties that a military option was not the best approach to dealing with the crisis. The US supported all resolutions introduced by France in the Security Council, expecting to get the Security Council ticket to legitimate its future intervention in Iraq.¹²⁰ The United States provided communications equipment and vehicles which enabled ECOMICI peacekeepers to patrol the zone of confidence that separated the rebel and government forces.¹²¹ The American expatriates were evacuated by American special forces soldiers. For the Ivorian conflict, the third criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the US contribution, is awarded 0.25 out of 1 (see table 8).

European Involvement (P)

Among European states, France was the most involved in the Ivorian crisis. As the country's former colonial ruler, France had significant economic interests in Côte

d'Ivoire. French investors and political advisors had traditionally played a key role in the world leading cocoa producer. France was particularly concerned because some 20,000 French citizens and about 600 soldiers within the *43^{eme} Bataillon d'Infanterie de Marine (BIMA)* operated in the country on a permanent basis. France had US \$ 3 billion in investment in Côte d'Ivoire and most of the lucrative sell-offs of public utilities, under the World Bank (WB) Structural Adjustment Program had ended up in the hands of French companies.¹²² The vagueness of the Defense Accords between France and Côte d'Ivoire as well as the confidential status of many of them, offered France room to interpret events in a way most convenient to it.¹²³ France restricted its military action to a mere interposition of its troops between the warring parties. After the outbreak of the conflict, France was very active in containing and resolving the Ivorian crisis. In the Foreign Affairs Department, Paris was not keen to be seen to support Gbagbo, but neither could Paris officially endorse an armed insurrection.¹²⁴ Not wanting to be alone in the cross-fire, Paris encouraged ECOWAS to create a contact group. The contact group traveled to Bouaké under French escort on Thursday, 3 October 2002.¹²⁵

Essone, a Parisian suburb hosted a round table of Ivorian political forces. The summit gave birth of the Linas-Marcoussis accords. The central points of the agreement focused on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) such as establishing a Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) to ensure an immediate end of hostilities, a timetable for free elections, and the release of military hostages being held by both sides. In addition, the agreement called for the monitoring of compliance by all sides to be reported to international, regional, and national authorities.¹²⁶ France also sent hundreds of additional troops to augment the approximately 600 already stationed there

to assist in evacuating foreign nationals and provide logistical support to government military forces.¹²⁷ By January 2003 France had established a 4,000 troop' security force, "Operation Licorne," whose primary mission had been to hold the east-west ceasefire line between government and rebel forces, preventing either side from advancing.¹²⁸

It is important to highlight the fact that France played a significant role in limiting the clash between government forces and the rebels. The French were very quick to deploy an initial force. On October 2002, the declaration made by Tuo Fozie, a leader and spokesperson for the rebels, calling France to observe a strict neutrality, showed the French burden from a rebellion's standpoint. In late 2004, France lost 9 peacekeepers when an aircraft of the Ivorian government forces bombed a French military installation in Bouaké during an offensive strike against rebel targets in the North. As retaliation, French forces destroyed the Ivorian air force capabilities. This event sparked an anti-French sentiment and put France in a difficult situation as most of the Ivorians perceived it as being in favor of the rebels. ECOMICI which deployed later mitigated the alleged impartiality of the French force. From a sustainment standpoint, France provided transport, uniforms, food, and pay to ECOMICI.¹²⁹ Other countries such as Great Britain and Belgium provided support respectively to Ghana and Belgium. For the Ivorian conflict, the fourth criterion of the variable pertaining to the extra regional support, the European involvement, is awarded 0.75 out of 1 (see table 8).

Assessment of ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes in Côte d'Ivoire

Impact on Regional Security

In spite of the regional intervention, the Ivorian conflict had humanitarian, economic and security consequences. Each of these consequences impacted badly on the

whole region. The humanitarian issue that followed the outbreak of the conflict had profound effects on the porous border security of the region because of uncontrolled cross border movement. The past regional conflicts have showed that interconnected conflicts can easily affect the whole region. Côte d'Ivoire shares more than 3,000 kilometers of land borders with five ECOWAS states including Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, and Mali. It is estimated that the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire produced half a million IDPs and about 70,000 refugees who fled the conflict areas to reach neighboring countries. Moreover, the new environment generated by the conflict affected the dynamics of economic cooperation and regional integration. Given the central position of Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa, the crisis had important economic consequences for the neighboring states. Indeed, at least 4 million of the 16 million inhabitants of Côte d'Ivoire were immigrants or descendants of immigrants from neighboring countries.¹³⁰ The social impact may trigger an unsecure restive environment. For this reason, impact on regional security, the first criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, is awarded a score of 1 out of 2 (see table 8).

Resolution and Prevention of Conflict Reoccurrence

It is quite difficult to measure the role of the regional force in resolving and preventing the reoccurrence of the Ivorian conflict because ECOMICI was neither the first nor the last force to deploy in Côte d'Ivoire. ECOMICI deployed after the French forces were on the ground and it was absorbed by UNOCI. To better assess the ECOMICI role in resolving and preventing the reoccurrence of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, it is worthy to ask if there would be a different outcome if ECOMICI did not

intervene. It is assumedly clear that with such a small sized force, ECOMICI by its own would hardly be capable of handling the Ivorian crisis.

Moreover, the logistical shortfalls it faced during its deployment would prevent it from fulfilling the specified tasks of its mandate. The nature of the Ivorian conflict, which was a complex power struggle, including religion, nationalism, and ethnicity was much more complicated than even the first Liberian conflict. For this reason, ECOMICI with its late deployment only played a marginal role in the resolution and prevention of the Ivorian conflict reoccurrence. However, ECOMICI played a role in setting the conditions where the belligerents accepted it as a third party. In some way ECOMICI helped prevent the reoccurrence of the conflict by occupying a buffer zone to prevent clash between the belligerents. The second criterion of ECOMOG peacekeeping outcomes, resolution and prevention of conflict reoccurrence, is awarded a score of 1.25 out of 2 (see table 8).

Display of Results for the Ivorian Case Study

A summary of the results of the analysis is as displayed in table 8 below.

Table 8. Summary of the Scores of Analysis for the Ivorian Conflict.

Variables Operation	Inputs															
	Peacekeeping Principles				Mechanism of Deployment				Capabilities within ECOMOG				Extra Regional Support			
A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	
Côte d'Ivoire	1	0.75	0.5	1	0.75	0.5	0.5	0.75	0	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.25	0.75
	Total: 3.25/4				Total: 2.75/4				Total: 1.75/4				Total: 2.5/4			

Outcomes Operation	Outcomes	
	ECOMOG Peacekeeping Outcomes	
Côte d'Ivoire	Impact on Regional Security	
	Resolution and Prevention of Conflict reoccurrence	
	1/2	1.25/2
Total: 2.25/4		

Source: Created by author.

Interpretative Analysis for the Case Studies

As stated in chapter 3, the case studies would be unnecessary if they are only content with showing results displayed in the different previous tables without revealing key results that are relevant for regional security in West Africa. From the general summary table for the three case study (see table 9), pertinent conclusions can be drawn.

Table 9. General Summary Table for the Three Case Studies.

Variables Operations	INPUTS				OUTCOMES
	Peace- keeping Principles	Mechanism of Deployment	Capabilities of the Force	Extra- regional Support	
Liberia	0.5	1.75	1	1.5	1.25
Guinea-Bissau	2.5	1.75	1	2	1.75
Côte d'Ivoire	3.25	2.75	1.75	2.5	2.25

Source: Created by author.


**Not one of the Four Variables Itself is Sufficient
to Ensure Greater Success**

The main conclusion from the three case studies is that there is no possibility to measure the impact of one isolated variable on the peacekeeping outcome. They all are important to ensure greater success since, for instance, the capabilities of a deployed regional force can be dependent on the other three variables. As an example, during the Ivorian conflict, the capabilities of ECOMICCI were closely linked to the level of the extra-regional support enabling the deployment and the sustainment of the force. In addition, the adoption of peacekeeping principles facilitated the force's operation on the ground because it was accepted by the belligerents. The mechanism of deployment provided the right mandate to be fulfilled by the force.

The Region Made Significant Progress to Improve the Outcome of its PKO

Another remark is that ECOWAS has learnt from the past. The Liberian conflict generated a significant amount of criticism to the regional force. This criticism included the lack of impartiality, shortfalls in terms of ethical behavior, logistical shortcomings. During the following conflicts, ECOWAS work on improving all these issues. As a result, despite many repeated failures, the regional force that deployed in Côte d'Ivoire was highly praised. As seen in the following table (table 10), the three case studies showed that there is significant improvement in terms of peacekeeping principles, mechanism of deployment, and extra-regional support. These variables became satisfactory in the last case study. However, without necessarily being the locomotive in terms of outcome, the capabilities variable is a subject of concern as it has the lowest score compared to the other selected variables. In addition, in terms of progress, it hardly improved from 1990, during the Liberia conflict, to 2004 with the Ivorian crisis. This situation leads to the conclusion that the force capabilities issue experienced in the region is chronic.

Table 10. Evolution of the Variables during the Case Studies



Source: Created by author.

The Participation of Nigeria Has Become Critical to any PKO in West Africa

The experience of PKO in Guinea-Bissau and in Côte d'Ivoire has painfully taught the lesson that the involvement of Nigeria, especially at the operational and tactical levels, is indispensable to alleviate the logistical shortfalls ECOMOG and ECOMICI encountered. In terms of personnel, Nigeria provided many more troops in Liberia than the whole region was able to provide in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire together. Even though the significant participation of Nigeria was justified by some national interests at stake in Liberia, it remains true that Nigeria provided the men and money that fueled the ECOMOG locomotive. Difficulties encountered in the ECOMOG military mission in Guinea-Bissau, which involved peacekeepers from Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo and had been ignominiously withdrawn after just four months, have forced a realization in the region about the importance of Nigeria's financial and military resources to peacekeeping in West Africa.¹³¹

Nigeria is the hegemony in West Africa in terms of geographical size, economical resources, and political and military capabilities. For instance, in terms of training resources, beside Ghana, only Nigeria has a Command and Staff College and a National Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) in West Africa. From an equipment prospective, Nigeria is also the only country with a defense production industry, the Defense Industry Corporation (DIC), which presently produces self-loading rifles (SLR).¹³² In terms of military personnel, the total of the other 14 ECOWAS member states' armed forces barely outnumbered the Nigerian military force (see table 7). In West Africa, an estimated 60 percent of the population is located in Nigeria.¹³³ This Nigerian

hegemony, which impacted on its PKO capabilities led to a feeling that Nigeria has a leadership role to play within the region.

However, it is for the region's sake that ECOWAS member states stop relying on an overwhelming involvement of Nigeria in PKO as it did in the past because of two reasons. First, Nigerian acceptance to pay significant military and economic costs is then questioned because the political environment has changed. In contrast with the past, Nigeria is today ruled by civilian regime. As Daniel Bach mentioned:

Nigeria's return to a civilian elected regime meant that checks and balances inherent in a democracy now overruled the patterns of unilateralism and instinctive behavior that had been the hallmark of military interventionism in the 1990s.¹³⁴

Second, the domestic issues faced by Nigeria constitute a stumbling block which may prevent it from being fully involved in any PKO. Internal problems such as interreligious violence and the current conflict in the Niger Delta region have bedeviled the country and show little signs of being alleviated in the foreseeable future.

Utilizing the Regional Force as a “Vanguard” Provides the Best Security Outcomes

A vanguard force can be defined as a force that is first deployed on the ground in order to stabilize a situation until a larger UN/AU force can be assembled to fulfill a mission. During the Ivorian conflict, the French prepositioned troops in Côte d'Ivoire were utilized as a vanguard force. Their impact in terms of casualty reduction was significant. It deployed quickly to prevent further confrontation between the belligerents. With the current mechanism based on the idea an ASF, the ESF can be tasked to deployed as quickly as possible before being reinforced by troops coming from another REC or beyond under the umbrella of the AU or the UN. Utilizing the regional force as a

vanguard force implies that the AU or the UN will ultimately take over the mission, because the main take-away of the three case studies is that it is hard for the region to venture into a protracted PKO. The involvement of the UN is a burden relief for ECOWAS which has typically struggled to satisfy the logistical needs of its deployed force. Moreover, in a regional crisis, the further involvement of troops from organizations such as the AU or the UN helps guarantee legitimacy.

The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Region Remain Similar

The ignorance of things fueling conflicts is not acceptable anymore since these things have remained the same for decades. If ECOWAS is to formulate effective responses to intrastate crises, it must understand the main drivers of conflict and use adequate tools to address these conflicts. The close look at the three case studies enables to identify three primary drivers of conflict. The struggle for power and leadership in political vacuums are common causes of the conflicts in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire. The main driver of these conflicts included leaders in power promising a quick return to democracy who were challenged by political adversaries denouncing rigged elections. Moreover, socio-economic and political inequity, along with grinding poverty made the populations predisposed to get involved in the struggle for changes which produced an interminable spiral of violence. As a result, the use of torture and police brutality were used to keep political adversaries at bay.

The Principles of Impartiality and Sustainability Important for Regional Credibility

Impartiality of the PKO forces and agreement of the warring parties to the presence of the force are critical to set the conditions favorable for an environment of

dialogue. Since a third party has an effect on conflict dynamics, its relations with the different protagonists of a crisis impacts on the issue of peace. The first case study, Liberia, has shown the difficult position of ECOMOG because of the NPFL accusations that the regional force intervened to support Doe's regime. The issue of impartiality denied ECOMOG any credibility to stand as a neutral organization sent to solve the Liberian conflict

The sustainability of the option chosen by regional leadership to deal with conflict is also important. This principle requires regional leadership to carefully estimate the appropriateness of its entry and exit strategies. The Guinea-Bissau episode was a regional nightmare because of the poor condition in which the regional force withdrew from Bissau. There was growing irritation in West Africa over ECOMOG's withdrawal from this country. The Guinea-Bissau case study shows that the exit strategy of the regional force finally was not determined by those on whose behalf the intervention has been undertaken, but by domestic opinion in the intervening countries (Benin, Gambia, Niger and Togo). This practice compromised the credibility of ECOWAS through its regional force.

An Ad hoc Regional Force System Has Very Limited Chance of Successes

First, internal conflicts following the end of the Cold War are characterized by their rapid spread and their unspeakable atrocities within short notice. The casualties of war are now predominantly civilians who are not only the victims of war but also the targets, with mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing, and other acts of aggression targeting civilians. The three case studies confirmed the fact that the early deployment of a strong

force is critical in order not only to separate the belligerents but also to prevent the warriors from further violence while negotiations are conducted. A robust and rapidly deployable military force is considered essential during the initial stages of a PKO in order to deter potential spoilers and establish the mission's credibility.

In Guinea-Bissau and in Côte d'Ivoire, it took the regional forces, 8 months and 6 months respectively after the outbreak of the civil war to fully deploy on the ground. Many atrocities happened between the actual outbreak of the conflict and the deployment of an intervening force. In Liberia, ECOMOG painfully struggled to deploy its force around Monrovia because Taylor's forces had more than enough time to strongly settle its tactical position. Unlike an ESF contingent which periodically trains together, an ad hoc regional force will not function effectively due to its lack of training. Because of PKO forces being established in an ad hoc nature, the generation of those forces took over 6 months to accomplish without any joint training exercise prior to their deployment.

International Support Depends on Self Interests

The extra-regional actors' motivation to intervene or to support a regional operation under the ECOWAS umbrella, in terms of finance and equipment, arise from a narrow national self-interest and not a sense of altruism. The Liberian conflict in 1990 witnessed the careless attitude of traditional extra-regional actors in the continent such as France and the US. Their attitude was dictated by unclear and even unperceived national interest from their prospective. Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire were quite different. During the Guinea-Bissau conflict, France was significantly involved since it provided the bulk of the logistical assets necessary for the success of the operation. This French

dedication should be seen as a way to preserve its interests in Guinea- Bissau. Among other things, those interests included the need for France to keep Guinea- Bissau under its West African sphere of influence. Côte d'Ivoire hosted a significant French investment and most of the economic activities ended up in the hands of French companies. As a result, France had a leading military and diplomatic role in the search of solution to end the Ivorian conflict. Finally, the three case studies showed that, as far as there are interests at stake, there will be extra-regional actors who inevitably will have their own interests which may be at odds with the well-being of the region.

In spite of Extra-Regional Programs, Deployed Regional Forces Still Experienced Logistical Difficulties

France, Great Britain and the United States are the most involved extra-regional actors in regional security in West Africa. Their respective programs such as RECAMP, ACOTA, and BMATT contributed in the training of civilian and military personnel dedicated to PKO. However, the past conflicts, especially those in Guinea-Bissau and in Côte d'Ivoire, saw ECOWAS painfully struggle to overcome its logistical weaknesses. Even though the efforts made by France in assisting the regional force which deployed in Guinea-Bissau and in Côte d'Ivoire deserve praise, the effectiveness of the extra-regional support is subject to question.

Initiated in 1997, the RECAMP initiative, a cost-cutting measure, is a program whose aim is to provide African armies with the support and expertise necessary to maintain security and stability in Africa by themselves. With this end in view, RECAMP identified two particular fields: training in certain fields for officers and troops and support for actual engagement (transport, logistic support or occasionally equipment).

According to the case studies, the mechanism for providing the needed support to the regional force was very slow. In addition to the late deployment most of the time due to slowness in the extra-regional support, the regional force in the two last case studies struggled on the ground because of daily logistical issues.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The regionalization of the responsibility for peace operations has long been established. The immediate past Cold War environment was characterized by an increase of intrastate conflicts and the international community's decreasing willingness to intervene. This environment promoted an awareness that a regional response is not only an opportunity to fix the security vacuum, but also a unique way to achieve the economic goals set during the creation of ECOWAS in May 1975. Since this regional response to local conflicts is a prerequisite for regional development, and devastating social and economical spill-over effects of violent conflict threaten stability, West Africa has made noticeable strides over past decades in terms of organizational reforms. Another rationale behind the regional approach to manage conflict is the actors' familiarity with the problem as well as their cultural and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict.

The different regional forces which deployed within the region have suffered from enormous resource and capacity constraints in the areas of sustainment, training and interoperability. These shortfalls are closely related to the meager military capabilities of each of ECOWAS member's states except Nigeria. This situation has also created a continuing dependence on foreign military, technical, logistical and financial assistance. In spite of these glaring military shortcomings, it is worthy to consider thinking about the progress made by the region during its laborious journey in the peace management field. For instance, the qualitative difference between the first regional intervention in Liberia

in 1990 and the more recent one in 2003 shows significant improvements in terms of regional readiness. Since the region still has a long way to go, the following recommendations may be useful to further increase this effectiveness. These recommendations indirectly answer the secondary questions asked in chapter 1.

1. In terms of regional security, which ECOMOG operations were successful or less successful and why?
2. What are the required local actions to be taken in order to fix things that used to hinder the efficiency of former ECOMOG interventions?
3. How can the ESF respond efficiently to regional security issues?
4. To what extent can West African countries have its traditional partners such as the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) help it support its efforts in building greater regional security?

Recommendations

In the past decades, ECOWAS has done a tremendous job aimed at setting the conditions where sustainable peace can thrive. Thanks to greater visibility, it also has undergone some profound institutional changes in order to improve its ability to meet the peacekeeping challenges many organizations have faced since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, the region has accumulated a significant wealth of experience in terms of conflict management. However, if peacekeeping is to continue being a tool to maintain international peace and security, the region should take into account the lessons learned from its past actions in the field on peace management. The honest and serious study of lessons learned, especially during failure, guarantees improvement for the future.

Criticism should then be seen as positive and necessary for the organization to move forward and develop clearer strategies that are practical and not theoretical.

There is an immediate need for West African states to overcome issues that may divide them and negatively impact on the effectiveness of any regional force. Much ink has been spilled in recent years about the heterogeneity of the states within West Africa. Indeed the region is described as the most varied in Africa in terms of colonially inherited languages, levels of economic development, and linkages to former colonial power. For instance, of the 15 ECOWAS member states, eight are Francophone, five Anglophone, and two Lusophone. These differences inevitably affect the view on the regional organization, ECOWAS. However, every ECOWAS member state needs to capitalize on their individual strengths by using them to provide greater effectiveness to the ESF and not let them become an obstacle to cooperative security efforts. This search for global stability should compel each state to clearly recognize that its security is closely linked with those of its neighbors.

The most common agreement among those who practice military and humanitarian tasks is that the current nature of modern conflict has changed deeply since the end of the Cold War. ECOWAS is in a position to understand this shift since it has been the first regional African organization to deal with post Cold War conflict specifically with the first Liberian War. Among other things, while state power has declined, warring parties are not easily identified and rules of combat have been abandoned. If ECOWAS wants to remain a credible organization engaged in peace management, it should at the same time adapt its troops and equipment to this changing environment of conflict PKO. The regional brigade needs to be trained for non-

conventional war which main characteristics are the use of small units, the primacy of intelligence and the necessity to engage the local population. Besides peacekeeping and peacemaking, further training on peace building is also critical for future operations.

Allegations of peacekeeper's misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse of the vulnerable portions of population under an environment of conflict, constitute serious threats. They jeopardize the security of the peacekeeping force itself because this misconduct is a driver of tension between the population and the force which is supposed to protect it. Moreover, misconduct also compromises the credibility of the organization since it creates negative strategic impacts and plays into the opponent's propaganda machine. For these reasons, ECOWAS should enforce a zero tolerance policy on abuse and exploitation of the civilian population. This policy will ultimately render each ESF soldier accountable for his own conduct. For this to happen, the regional organization needs to issue a compilation of unequivocal guidance on disciplinary issues. The different leaders of a force should also sustain a disciplined command climate evidenced by consistent adherence to disciplinary guidance.

Each of the fifteen ECOWAS member states should open an ESF bureau in their respective joint staff. Each bureau should be under the leadership of a liaison officer senior enough to influence his leaders through his national chain of command for more commitment on ESF manning and materiel. Moreover, the creation of an ESF planning bureau would enable better coordination between regional and national headquarters. These national bureaus would ensure that the force meets the different requirements in terms of force composition, force readiness, and equipment.

A West African force should include units from at least half if not the totality of ECOWAS member states. These member states should prove willing to make their respective troops fully available for regional PKOs or those beyond their region. For this regional involvement to occur, ECOWAS needs to engage and encourage its member states to commit human and financial resources needed to conduct successful PKO. This large involvement is important as it prevents any regional force to be seen as a Nigerian tool because of the usual overwhelming percentage of Nigerian troops within that force. In addition, the large participation of ECOWAS member states in the building of a regional force helps consolidate the credibility of ECOWAS. The argument that the level of commitment and interest may not be high in states which are far removed from the area of conflict is no longer valid.

The region should give greater importance to its prevention mechanism known as the EWS. Acknowledging the regional dependence on military assistance, it becomes obvious that the region cannot afford to handle two simultaneous peacekeeping missions. In order to avoid a surge in demand for PKO and being overstretched with its already limited capacity, it is critical that ECOWAS engage in a dialogue with those involved in potential conflict. By addressing little problems upstream, there is a hope to prevent them from becoming bigger problems later. The consequences of allowing latent threats to become manifest are severe. The essential point of emphasis here is that, for instance, the quasi simultaneity of the Sierra Leonean and the Guinea-Bissau conflict has showed that trying to handle two peacekeeping missions at the same time is unrealistic.

One of the main objectives of a PKO is to achieve the earliest possible transfer of responsibility to other actors such as local and national authorities and international

actors that assist with development and other issues. However, ECOWAS should acknowledge the fact that quick fix solutions for intrastate crises are much more dangerous because they are in some circumstances the main causes of further instability. Only holding elections does not necessarily represent a fair measurement of PKO effectiveness since the root causes of conflict remain ignored. It is ECOWAS' duty to make sure that every peace management it works on lays the foundations for sustainable peace.

It is worthy to remember that the move from an ad hoc to a standby force expresses a regional will to bridge the gap between the outbreak of a conflict and the actual deployment of a regional force. This gap, as demonstrated in the previous case studies, caused a significant rate of civilian casualties. It would be quite a pity if the new mechanism known as the ESF is unable to improve its rapidly deployable capacities and planning. A regional organization's geographical proximity should facilitate more rapid responses to conflicts within the region. Ultimately, the ability to promptly deploy both civilian and military capabilities will be decisive for PKO successes.

With the view of overcoming the OAU's unsatisfactory record in terms of peace and security, the AU was established in 2002 with more emphasis on conflict management. Even before the idea of the creation of regional standby forces, some scholars have argued that the primary responsibility for defining the decision to intervene, especially when it involves the deployment of forces, should be at the continental level. Since the new mechanism is under a continental framework within the ASF construct, the AU is expected to play a greater role in managing peace. With the new peace management scenario, when a conflict is likely to occur, AU active

involvement is expected to be automatic since it will probably encourage the eventual participation of the UN. The continental early involvement helps create the conditions for a subsequent engagement of the wider international community. Moreover, the continental body should encourage the injection of extra-regional troops into any regional force in order to build a sense of continental solidarity forcing the AU to take greater responsibility.

The main recommendation for extra-regional actors is focused on the nature and the quality of their support for the regional approach. Even though it is unrealistic to believe that the extra-regional actors' degree of involvement will be separated from their respective national interest, it is critical that ECOWAS encourages these actors to coordinate their different programs. The new conflict management mechanism under the AU should channel the multiplicity of extra-regional initiatives and programs devoted to the continental capacity in order to make these initiatives integrated and synchronized. It is also worthy to consider that, from a geographical standpoint, Africa is Europe's immediate neighbor separated only by the Mediterranean Sea. It would be a mistake to imagine that Europe can continue to prosper and ignore the millions of people struggling with these seemingly never-ending conflicts. The extra-regional actors' support should also include the development of regional interoperability of tactics, technique, procedures and equipment. The region should also enlarge its cooperation with other partners such as China which has significant economic and national interests in Africa, especially in West Africa. Since China has invested billions of dollars in the region, its interest on regional stability is huge.

The UN has an obligation, as clearly spelled out in the UN Charter, to address situations that are a threat to international peace and security. To do so, the UN should continue to praise the regional move into conflict management and help the region fulfill its peace objectives. The fields in which the UN should assist the region include putting pressure on belligerents. The UN needs to play a more coercive role of increasing pressure. For instance, Security Council sanctions are critical to alleviate widespread of violence because of their potentially relative effect. Moreover, since the region lacks the ability for post-conflict operations, the UN is expected to bring integrated peace building assets that enable addressing reconciliation and reconstructions needs of the conflict area. Finally, the burden-sharing is mutually beneficial for the UN and for West Africa. For this reason, a hybrid scenario in which the UN takes over a mission once the situation has been stabilized by a regional force, should be adopted. Ultimately the UN involvement on regional peace management enables the world organization to keep control by the oversight of its Security Council.

Recommendations for Future Study

The new mechanism under the AU umbrella does not really integrate the possibility of reducing interstate conflict. Instead, the main focus of the ESF is on intrastate crises. Further study can review the feasibility for the regional organization to deal with conflict between states within this new mechanism.

Also, since China has significant economic interests at stake in the region, due to its energetic appetite, it is worthy to look at the nature of support China can offer to help stabilize the region.

Almost two decades of armed crises in West Africa have left the region awash with huge quantities of SALW. In addition, the issue of border porosity is still devastating, it would be useful for further study to look at a way to address these issues in order to help prevent cross-border trafficking without hindering the free movement of people and goods.

Conclusion

The primary purpose behind the creation of ECOWAS was economic. When ECOWAS later ventured into the field of security, as an implied task to achieve its economic purpose, it was initially hailed as a bold organization concerned about the stability of West Africa. So, ECOWAS was at a vanguard position with a decade-long peace management experience when the AU established the ASF. In order to firmly remediate the security shortcomings, political will is still among the most critical requirements. This regional organization can address the main drivers of tensions within the region, but without mustering the necessary political will, any other effort may be in vain. Moreover, with appropriate strategies, the West African region can certainly help to ease the international burden in terms of peacekeeping in Africa. ECOWAS has made successful efforts to improve its peacekeeping capabilities, but there is much more that should be done in order to set the conditions for stability in West Africa. Ultimately, the consideration of the previous recommendations could help alleviate the difficulties inherent to any peace management task.

APPENDIX A

DEFINITION OF VARIABLES USED IN THE CASE STUDIES

Consent Agreement: Consent agreement is the acceptance of an intervening force by the warring parties. It is usually not easy to obtain because of the perception that an intervening force is always a burden for one side of the conflict. The consent agreement follows a guarantee by the intervening force that it is impartial and only acts in the interests of the different parties. The belligerents may insist that the force includes elements from mutually acceptable countries. The presence and degree of consent may determine the success of a PKO. The disputing parties demonstrate their acquiescence in a peacekeeping force by the degree to which they consent to it.

Ethical behavior: The ethical behavior measures the conduct of the peacekeepers in relation with, among other things, the local population, and the detainees. It means being in accordance with the accepted principles of right and wrong that govern the conduct of PKOs. Ethical behavior is acting in ways that are consistent with universal peacekeepers' values, international laws of war such as the Geneva Convention.

Impartiality: Without becoming an excuse for inaction, impartiality is considered as a third party's principle which bases decisions on objective criteria, rather than on the basis of bias or preference for one party over another. Impartiality shows a lack of favoritism in order to preserve neutrality and enable an intervening force to be trusted by the warring parties.

Legitimacy: Legitimacy has to do with rights. It provides an organization or a peacekeeping force the recognition to set the conditions where agreements can be reached. This legitimacy is derived from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties.

The legitimacy of peacekeeping forces in the eyes of the belligerents impacts significantly on the success of the PKOs because it provides the basis for consent from the warring parties.

Regional commitment: It assesses the dedication of ECOWAS member states to a conflict within the region. This commitment is measured through the individual member states' level of involvement in terms of financing, and troop contributions.

Regional responsiveness: It analyses the reaction of ECOWAS and its regional force to a conflict. From the outbreak of a conflict to the actual deployment of a force, regional responsiveness assesses the efforts done within the region in terms of strategic, operational and tactical insights. Ultimately, regional responsiveness enables to know whether or not the regional organization and its intervening force have addressed the issues of a conflict within an acceptable timeframe.

The ability to work with NGOs and the UN: Since NGOs and UN observers typically cannot be deployed in a conflict zone without the security assistance of a peacekeeping force, the relationships between them is critical to set the conditions conducive for peacekeeping success. Their ability to work together enables humanitarian relief for the population. Levels of trust and mutual respect are the main elements to look at to assess a regional force's ability to work with NGOs and the UN.

The Command and Control: It is the exercise of authority and direction by a field commander who deals with operational and tactical operations on the ground and a Special Representative of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary (SRES) whose task is to direct PKOs of the force in accordance with the guidance of ECOWAS leadership. The

effective existence of these two persons is a source of success, especially if they have a good relationship and understand their respective tasks.

The extra-regional support: Former conflicts within Africa witnessed the direct and indirect involvement of external actors such as the AU, the UN, the US or former colonial powers whose interests were put at stake. For a conflict within the region, the involvement of these extra-regional actors is measured quite differently depending on their nature. For instance, in contrast with the UN and the AU being expected to provide an adequate level of involvement wherever a conflict takes place in Africa, for conflict occurring in a former French colony, France is expected to play a more direct role.

The logistical aptitude: It looks at the ability of ECOWAS to sustain its force sent to intervene in a conflict. This aptitude is assessed through the capability of immediate deployment and sustainment of the regional force without being delayed for logistical shortcomings.

The soundness of mandate: It is a significant element which determines the outcome of a peacekeeping force on the ground. Since a mandate is to be implemented by a force, a close look at a mandate in a conflict enables to foresee the size of the force needed. Moreover, besides the tasks identified in a mandate, the soundness of a mandate includes the definition of clear exit conditions.

The tactical and operational gain: The gain of the force is assessed through the different achievements of the deployed force on the ground. This tactical and operational gain includes the right fulfillment of the tasks contained in the mandate and the success in providing general security, not only to the local population, but also to the different belligerents.

Understanding of the conflict: It is a measurement which assesses the regional self-awareness in order to understand if the region takes into account all the data relevant to the search for solutions in a conflict. It includes the understanding of root causes, the objectives of the different belligerents and the implication of external actors who usually provide support to conflicting parties.

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